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Abstract
Friedrich Schelling has re-emerged recently in Anglo-Saxon philosophy as a singularly
important figure in German Idealism, not as some mediate figure in between Kant,
Fichte, and Hegel. Because Schelling’s works resist being subsumed into a univocal or
systematic articulation, they instead invite a reading, in the sense developed by Jean-Luc
Nancy, that itself is transported to the writing of his texts. In order to show the autoimmune character of Schelling’s writing, this thesis will turn to Schelling’s First Outline
of a System of the Philosophy of Nature (1799), the Philosophical Investigations into the
Essence of Human Freedom (1809), and the unfinished The Ages of the World (1815).
These texts show that the recent resurgence of Schelling in theory and philosophy is not
because of philosophy’s re-discovery of Schelling, but that Schelling is representative of
the crisis in which theory and philosophy currently find themselves, articulating a
deconstructive writing avant-la-lettre.

Keywords
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, 1775-1854; German Idealism; Deconstruction;
Writing; Philosophy of Nature; Absolute Idealism; Trauma; Repression; Derrida; Nancy;
Bataille.
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1
The Writing of Nature: Schelling’s First Outline

1. 1 Introduction
Reading Friedrich Schelling’s First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of
Nature is rather different than reading works from Schelling’s contemporaries during the
period of what is now called German Idealism. Schelling may share a historical time and
space with Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, but his writings were never quite like theirs. Even
Schelling admits of the First Outline, in terms of the text’s written construction, that the
“same demands cannot rightfully be made upon a treatise that has been written solely and
exclusively to serve as a guide for lectures” (Schelling First Outline 3). It is for precisely
this reason that I have chosen the First Outline as a text through which we enter into the
more ‘general text’ that is Schelling’s body of work. Under the assemblage of this
project’s focus on texts ranging from 1795 up to 1815, this chapter seeks to establish the
First Outline as a first instance of Schelling’s ‘body of work’ as a body that is not whole
yet still alive. Like Gilles Deleuze’s ‘body without organs,’ Schelling’s texts seek to
account for themselves in the process of their own writing, and, as a result, are in
possession of a vitality that cannot be, or resists being, subsumed or absolutized under
one determinate principle, one body, one organization, one organ. In other words, taking
up the writing (écriture), in the sense developed by Jacques Derrida, that is specific to
Schelling as the interpretive point of departure for the First Outline, I argue that the text
is simultaneously productive and critical of its productivity as it puts under erasure–and
in some cases undoes–the concepts, ideas, and organizational structures that it lays before
the reader as ‘finished’ products.

	
  

	
  

2
Within the larger context of this thesis, the aim of this chapter is to establish a

critical reading of Schelling’s philosophical texts from the Philosophical Letters on
Dogmatism and Criticism up to and including The Ages of the World. This reading, to
borrow from Jean-Luc Nancy’s reading of Hegel in The Speculative Remark, finds itself
“transported to the writing” of the text and to “the plasticity of the exposition” (Nancy
Speculative Remark 13). For reading “is a matter of grasping [empoigner] the proposition
otherwise–and of grasping the entire philosophical writing by another end, by two ends,
or still otherwise, who knows?” (Nancy Speculative Remark 12-13). To read Schelling is
to read a philosophical work from a literary perspective in the sense developed by
Derrida, in the words of Rodolphe Gasché: “‘Literature’s’ subversion of both philosophy
and literature, of both truth and the simulacrum . . . proceeds from its status as a between,
forming a certain corner, a certain angle, with respect to both literature and philosophy”
(Gasché Tain of the Mirror 260). A reading of this sort is never a clinical operation
performed on the text, but works from inside the text “otherwise” in order to read closely
the plasticity of speculative language. This allows for new ways of orienting oneself
within the text or uncovering how the text re-orients itself. “Because to philosophize
about nature means as much as to create it,” writes Schelling at the beginning of the First
Outline (Schelling First Outline 5), so too is the philosophy of nature a creating of nature
as much as it is a writing of nature whose “analysis can not be permitted to stop at any
one thing that is a product; it can only cease with the purely productive.” Therefore, one
is never finished reading, since the text is never finished its writing, which is a writing
that invites a philosophical reading that is itself infinite.
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1. 2 The Underwriting of Speculative Philosophy
	
  
The infinite or absolute character of Schelling’s nature as a pure productivity has
not gone unnoticed. Recently, with the publication of Philosophies of Nature After
Schelling, Iain Hamilton Grant argues that one of Schelling’s greatest contributions to
philosophy was his work on Naturphilosophie. For Grant, “metaphysics cannot be
pursued in isolation from physics” (Grant Philosophies of Nature vii), and it is only after
Schelling’s Naturphilosophie that one can pursue this path. Amongst others known
currently as proponents of speculative realism1, Grant’s project seeks to overturn Kant’s
pre-eminence in philosophy in order to return to and accomplish the “greater project of
metaphysics”. What Grant has rightfully shown is that Schelling filled in the gap left by
Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason that excluded nature from the purview of
philosophical investigation. Appropriating Kant’s method in the Critique of Pure Reason
and influenced by Fichte’s subjective idealism from the Wissenschaftslehre, Schelling
takes both these philosophers out of the realm of the subjective and inserts them into the
realm of the objective by placing transcendental idealism into nature. This procedure,
according to Grant, does not seek to give an idealistic explanation of nature but a physical
explanation of idealism. Schelling’s Naturphilosophie is thus taken up as a critique of
Kantian and Fichtean idealism and the transcendentalist focus upon the unfolding of the
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Speculative realism gets its name from the event “‘Speculative Realism: A One-Day Workshop’ [that]
took place on 27 April 2007 at Goldsmiths, University of London, under the auspices of the Centre for the
Study of Invention and Social Process, co-sponsored by Collapse. Rather than announcing the advent of a
new theoretical ‘doctrine’ or ‘school’, the event conjoined four ambitious philosophical projects–all of
which boldly problematize the subjectivistic and anthropocentric foundations of much of ‘continental
philosophy’ while differing significantly in their respective strategies for superseding them” (Collapse III
307). The one-day workshop included philosophers Ray Brassier, Quentin Meillassoux, Iain Hamilton
Grant, and Graham Harman and is featured in Collapse: Philosophical Research and Development Volume
III, 2007. For more on Speculative Realism, see Brassier’s Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction,
Meillassoux’s After Finitude: An Essay On The Necessity of Contingency, Grant’s Philosophies of Nature
After Schelling, and Harman’s Guerilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things.
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subjective absolute. According to Grant, Schelling escapes the correlationist paradigm
imposed by Kant’s prohibition of thinking the thing-in-itself precisely because he turns
nature into the thing-in-itself, thereby transposing metaphysics to physics, and
supposedly solves the problem of the divide between subject and object. Therefore,
“Schelling’s hypothesis is,” according to Grant, “that there is a naturalistic or physicalist
ground of philosophy”; quoting from Schelling: “For what we want is not that Nature
should coincide with the laws of our mind by chance . . . but that she herself, necessarily
and originally, should not only express, but realize, the laws of our mind” (Grant
Philosophies of Nature 2). In this sense, for Grant the product within nature is always an
expression or a manifestation of absolute nature, considered as absolute productivity, in
the same way as the way we think nature is itself established through, and is a part of,
nature’s dynamically generative project.
However, Grant’s reading of Schelling limits his importance to the philosophy of
nature and loses sight of Schelling’s middle work, especially the Philosophical
Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and The Ages of the World, which he
gestures to but does not really investigate. Grant’s oversight arises precisely from reading
the “prius of thinking . . . [as] necessarily nature” (Grant “Speculative Realism” 342), as
well as the prius of Schelling’s philosophy as necessarily the philosophy of nature . “[T]o
consider the naturephilosophy core to Schellingianism, rather than just a phase” (Grant
Philosophies of Nature 3) is Grant’s solution for rescuing Schelling from his intermediate
status between Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. But, because Grant homogenizes “nature,” he
risks turning Schelling into an ‘–ism,’ and therefore stymies any critical appraisal of the
distinct figurations of nature throughout Schelling’s texts. Grant is correct in pointing out

	
  

	
  

5

that Schelling remained committed to Naturphilosophie even in the Freedom essay,
insofar as Schelling argues “that nature must furnish . . . the only possible basis for a
philosophy of freedom,” and “[e]ven by 1830, with the Introduction to Philosophy . . .
naturephilosophy remains the ‘substrate of the entire system’ of philosophy (1989a: 55)”
(Grant Philosophies of Nature 5). In contrast, though Grant is correct in arguing that the
categorical division of Schelling’s works into discrete phases impairs a reading that seeks
continuity in his work, so too does Grant’s prioritizing of Naturphilosophie; this locks
Schelling into one single articulation of his development, which indeed does away with
reading him in phases, but also misreads Schelling as a dogmatic realist rather than a
philosopher who tries to think through the problem of correlationism raised by Kant
before him. As opposed to Grant’s reading, Schelling absolutizes nature, not merely to
get rid of the gap between subject and object, but in fact as a means to think through the
divide between real and ideal as the fundamental condition of the process of thought,
since, as Grant aptly notes, the philosophy of nature “entails that speculation becomes
necessary, as the only means not of assessing the access that we have, but of the
production of thought” (Grant “Speculative Realism” 334).
Quentin Meillassoux, another speculative realist, provides a more elaborate
critique of Kantian and Fichtean idealism2 than does Grant, and provides the critique
around which all speculative realists unite: the critique of correlationism. In After
Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, Meillassoux’s central critique of
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One must be prudent and add that speculative realism would only be critiquing the early Fichte and not
the later works of Fichte after the Jena period. Fichte’s Berlin period (1799-1814) was a period of transition
in comparison to Fichte’s earlier work, changing the primacy of the ich-form of the I as absolute to
“something absolute prior to and originally independent of the I (Seyn, ‘Being,’ or Gott, ‘God’)” (Žižek
“Fichte’s Laughter” 124).
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Kant revolves around Kant’s development of what Meillassoux has called correlationism,
“the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between
thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other”
(Meillassoux 5). This term, which refers to Kant’s epistemological framework of the
subject-object relation is, for Meillassoux as well as for Grant,3 responsible for
eliminating the possibility of thinking the absolute from any standpoint except that of the
subject. Meillassoux writes,
Critical philosophy does not prohibit all relation between thought and the
absolute. It proscribes any knowledge of the thing-in-itself (any application of the
categories to the supersensible), but maintains the thinkability of the in-itself.
According to Kant, we know a priori that the thing-in-itself is non-contradictory
and that it actually exists. (Meillassoux 35)
This thinkability of the in-itself as the limit to theory and philosophy, argues Meillassoux,
is due to the restriction imposed upon philosophy, theory, and thought by the fallacy of
correlationism. The limits of correlationism further stipulate that we cannot know
anything outside of us except in relation to how we think it; in other words, “this space of
exteriority is merely the space of what faces us, of what exists only as a correlate of our
own existence” (Meillassoux 7). Contemporary philosophers, according to Meillassoux,
have thus forgotten what it means to think the “absolute outside of pre-critical thinkers,”
that “outside which was not relative to us, and which was given as indifferent to its own
givenness to be what it is, existing in itself regardless of whether we are thinking of it or
not” (Meillassoux 7). The goal of speculative realism, then, is to “uncover an absolute
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Although Grant does not use the word “correlationism” in his book, Philosophies of Nature after
Schelling, he does critique Kant for prohibiting knowledge of the thing-in-itself. Grant thus pits Schelling’s
works on Naturphilosophie against Kant’s critical philosophy and post-Kantian subjective idealism, but this
in fact misreads or ignores attempts made by Kant in his Opus Postumum and further Hegel’s work on the
Philosophy of Nature, as texts that try to conceive of metaphysics according to physics. In reality, Grant is
at his best when he reads Schelling with the philosophical and scientific evidence which informed his
writings during the period of Schelling’s naturephilosophy.
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necessity that does not reinstate any form of absolutely necessary entity” (Meillasoux 34)
such as God, an absolute organism, phlogiston, etc., all while remaining free of the
limitations imposed by the correlationist paradigm that would limit philosophy’s ability
to think the absolute, specifically to think of the absolute as an a-subjective, factical
principle.
But what is it about correlationism that actually limits thought from thinking the
absolute in terms of facticity or otherwise as the subtitle of After Finitude indicates:
thinking the absolute in terms of the necessity of contingency? According to Meillassoux,
there are two kinds of correlationism, one weak and one strong. The weak version is that
supported by the Kantian critical philosophy as described above, and does not concern
Schelling as much as it does Kant and Fichte. For weak correlationism provides that the
thing-in-itself be thought as a “principle [which] require[s] that there be a possible
explanation for every worldly fact,” (Meillassoux 33) and as a principle that we cannot
obtain “positive knowledge of . . . through the use of a logical principle alone”
(Meillassoux 32) or as something that can be intuited in the world. Therefore, Kant’s
weak correlationism thinks the thing-in-itself, according to Meillassoux, as a priori, noncontradictory, as causa sui, and as actually existing. The strong version, on the other
hand, is more relevant to this reading of Schelling seeing that Meillassoux includes
Schelling’s conception of nature in the list of strong correlationist ideas that must be put
to the test against the speculative realist project. Firstly, all correlationism posits the
thesis “of the essential inseparability of the act of thinking from its content. All we ever
engage with is what is given-to-thought, never an entity subsisting by itself” (Meillassoux
After 36). In other words, this means that there is no way to think of anything outside of
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the correlation of subject-object; to think the absolute would be illegitimate because any
thinking would remain caught in what we think, therefore no one can claim legitimate
knowledge of the absolute or come to know the thing-in-itself. The second tactic attached
to strong correlationism, and this is more along the lines of Schelling’s thought, is
“absolutizing the correlation itself” (Meillassoux 37). The absolutization of the
correlation itself, according to Meillassoux, ignores the first principle of correlationism,
and thus creates a system founded upon the correlation itself under a third term, which
Schelling’s nature becomes in his work during the period of Naturphilosophie.
Meillassoux finds this most troubling, arguing that this amounts to a fideism,
stating, “fideism is merely the other name for strong correlationism” (Meillassoux 48).
What this absolutization reveals for Meillassoux is not that the thing-in-itself is known,
nor that the impossible is possible for thought, but that “it is unthinkable that the
unthinkable be impossible” (Meillassoux 41). This results, for Meillassoux, in “the most
general thesis of the strong model [which] pertains to the existence of a regime of
meaning that remains incommensurable with rational meaning because it does not pertain
to the fact of the world, but rather to the very fact that there is a world” (Meillassoux 41).
As a result, Meillassoux argues that strong correlationism has never been able to
eliminate the reality of dogmatism because strong correlationism makes the same
mistake, that is, that existence cannot be thought as ungrounded. In other words,
correlationism is at fault because it thinks something must come from nothing; therefore
it must entail that existence is capable of being thought because the impossibility of
existence is itself impossible. In this sense, Meillassoux’s critique challenges every
correlationist philosophy to account for the absolute contingency of reality. If they
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cannot, Meillassoux maintains that any philosophy that falls under the model of
correlationism is responsible for the widespread religiosity of contemporary philosophy,
which amounts to a tacit acceptance and subordination to theism. The radical failure of
critical philosophy, according to Meillassoux, would not be that it could not account for
the absolute, but that it has led to the destruction of metaphysics, because it is incapable
of thinking unreason as the absolute possibility of all existence.
Yet, contrary to Meillassoux, I argue that Schelling’s maintenance of strong
correlationism in the First Outline, and by the same token the maintenance of any
correlationism, is necessary for a reading that is transported to the écriture of the text.
The critical turn, insofar as it is a critique of pure reason, is a critique of the methodology
for how one approaches the absolute, which, as a result, has laid the foundation for
deconstruction. The act of deconstruction as a reading, a process, or an activity that
separates and critiques the opposition between text and sub-text, that reads that which
removes itself from the text, and as a philosophy that occupies itself with writing, would
not exist if not for the critical tradition that came after Kant and exists as a result of his
efforts. Indeed, what Meillassoux fails to recognize, but what Schelling recognized early
on in the Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, is that correlationism, or
what Schelling called criticism, was always aware of its inability to disprove dogmatism,
since the “Critique of Pure Reason has taught dogmaticism how it can become
dogmatism” (Schelling PL 169). For criticism approaches the absolute in a similar way to
dogmatism but from a different point of departure; that is, criticism recognizes, to a
certain extent, that the in-itself removes itself from difference so as to constitute
difference. Further, as opposed to dogmatism, criticism is critically aware of its own
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systematic organization as a philosophy that begins from the point of the cognitive
faculty rather than from a point of objective or subjective truth; as Schelling writes, “the
Critique of Pure Reason started its contention from that point alone. How did we ever
come to judge synthetically?” (Schelling, PL 164). If we begin from this point, then, the
Critique provides contentions from within its own structure, inscribing at its limits the
process by which those limits are themselves produced and complicated, asserted and
subverted, or written and underwritten.
What distinguishes Schelling from Kant, though, is that he extends the
consequences of the critical philosophy out towards the practical side of philosophy,
transporting transcendental idealism into the realm of the philosophy of nature; if
theoretical practices that seek the unconditioned are “unable to realize the unconditioned,
it [theoretical philosophy] therefore demands the act through which it ought to be
realized” (Schelling PL 167). In other words, Schelling was aware of the limitations of
theoretical as well as critical philosophy, as Grant rightly argues, for he recognizes the
gap between subjective idealism and the philosophy of nature as being constitutive and
fundamental. Criticism was never meant to establish one philosophy that explains all of
existence; instead, “from the idea of a system as such, the Critique of Pure Reason has
first proved that no system, whatever its name, is, in its consummation, an object of
knowledge, but merely an object of an activity [Handlung], a practically necessary but
infinite activity” (Schelling PL 171). This necessary and infinite activity becomes for
Schelling the opposition of subjective idealism and nature as two diametrically opposed
systems that enter into a dialectical relation with each other, not as a system of
knowledge but as a system that writes about the absolute in the process of its own
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becoming. Criticism, in the way Schelling develops it, is evident in the works during the
period in which he wrote the First Outline and even, yet in a more limited capacity, in the
System of Transcendental Idealism. Finally this critical writing reaches a more complex
and mature exposition in the Freedom essay and in the three extant versions of The Ages
of the World as Schelling further sets nature in opposition to the subject of God as a way
to think the in-itself. It is not until these later works, though, that the opposition acquires
a more existential sensibility, whereas the First Outline and the System stay more within
the bounds of their genre’s systematic limitations, the former within the realm of nature
or the object and the latter remaining more within the realm of the intelligence or the
subject.
In this sense, strong correlationism turns into a creative process rather than an
absolute, fixed cognitive framework as Meillassoux has argued. Because the
correlationist project fails to close off the possibility of thinking the absolute, its failure
leads to a writing that underwrites systematic philosophy’s attempts at closure, once
again opening the point that once seemed to limit, constrain, or suppress the system’s
activity. Schelling’s sustained strong correlationism, insofar as it absolutizes the
correlationist model developed by Kant by grounding nature as the in-itself, leads to a
system that begins from the point of the unrestrained absolute in an attempt to maintain
and close off the correlationist circle established between subject and object, intelligence
and nature, ideal and real, and, most importantly in the First Outline, productivity and
product. Yet, taking the absolute as the point of departure in order to lead to the system’s
closure proves to be yet another radically different means of opening and unbounding the
unthinkability of the absolute by unleashing upon it those repressed things that it kept
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hidden and in the dark. In this sense, Schelling’s correlationism brings the unthinkable
face to face with its own impossibilities, complicating the absolute by means of its own
postulates.
In the First Outline, nature is that unrestrained absolute, that “unconditioned,”
(Schelling First Outline 13) from which the system originates and from which it is
produced, “insofar as it is at once productive and product” (Schelling First Outline 194).
This figure of the absolute, contrary to Meillassoux and Grant, inaugurates an autodeconstructive writing of nature in the First Outline precisely because it is a work that
upsets the opposition between nature and spirit or Naturphilosophie and transcendental
idealism as a result of its auto-genesis (auto-poeisis) and, by the same token, its autodeconstruction. Schelling’s theorization of the absolute, as an absolute that generates
itself from out of itself, thus unworks any naïve conception of the peaceful
complementarity between subject and object or nature and spirit, which reveals a
violence that lay subjacent underneath the apparent and normative organization of the
text. Therefore, the First Outline, as will be shown, represents a writing through which
Schelling thinks the absolute, wherein nature is a figure of this writing rather than, as
Grant argues, the core principle of Schelling’s entire philosophy. We therefore read the
First Outline in continuity with the rest of Schelling’s works, not as the site of the origin
or as the beginning. To do so would be to misrepresent the First Outline as the
achievement and solution of idealist philosophy, rather than as an instance of idealism’s
crisis itself.
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1. 3 The Incommensurable Introduction
However, a little history behind the writing of the First Outline is necessary
before we begin any theorization of the writing of nature itself. Keith R. Peterson, the
translator and editor of the most recent translation of the First Outline, based his
translation of the text on “volume 7 (2001) of the historical-critical edition published by
the Schelling Commission in affiliation with the Bayern Academy of Sciences” (Peterson
xxxvii). Maintaining the “unpolished quality” of the original lecture notes and preserving
“Schelling’s use of emphasis and liberal employment of the em dash,” (Peterson ibid.),
Peterson has presented the reader with a text that is as close to the spirit of Schelling’s
lectures as when they were first presented in Jena in 1799. Unlike the original lecture
notes, Peterson inserted chapter headings according to the framework provided in
Schelling’s “Outline of the Whole,” which Peterson has also placed before the actual
exposition of the First Outline. Peterson’s insertion, however, does not stick with the
writing of the text, since its function as a guiding supplement cannot subdue the
unruliness of the text; indeed the Outline’s brief summary does not stand a chance as it
becomes radically undone through the text’s fuller exposition of its ideas.
Alongside these, the First Outline is presented in the same book as the
Introduction to the Outline, which was a piece that was written in the same year as, but
issued separately from, the text in 1799. In relation to the main text, the Introduction to
the Outline feels less like an outline or a preliminary rationale than an appendix that
comes after the fact, trying to impose itself also as a guide to the First Outline, by trying
to organize the body of the text whose organs and organization just are not there.
Peterson, like the editors of the 19th-century Sämmtliche Werke edition of Schelling’s

	
  

	
  

14

works–but not like the Bayern Academy of Sciences edition from 19764–places the
Introduction after rather than before the actual exposition of the First Outline. Because
the Introduction was always published this way, it thus acquires an oppositional and
incongruous quality that contradicts the text that it is supposed to introduce. Unable to
frame a text that resists the framing it imposes, there is nothing surprising about
attributing a forceful quality on the Introduction in relation to the First Outline; why else
would Schelling publish them separately and not as a whole?
Furthermore, although I have chosen to use the title ‘First Outline’ provided by
Peterson’s translation for this thesis, the German title, Erster Entwurf, also translates into
English as ‘first design,’ ‘first project,’ or, most succinctly, as ‘first draft.’ The difference
between the titles of ‘First Outline’ and ‘First Draft’ is that the text presents itself not as a
finished product but one that is still in the process of its own production; therefore the
text should be read more as a draft than as an outline. The First Outline’s lability,
furthermore, in relationship to the univocal and unidirectional stability of the
Introduction, complicates how one should read these texts together. Should they be read
back to front or front to back? Further complications arise when one has to account for
the multiplicity of footnotes and textual remarks that Peterson has included within the
text in order to stay true to the “handwritten manuscript used by Schelling in the Jena
lectures, [which was] unfortunately destroyed during the Second World War” (Peterson
xxxvii), but was luckily appended to the Sämmtliche Werke edition as footnotes.
Structurally, then, the First Outline has no proper beginning. The First Outline as well as
the Introduction turn out to be drafts that attempt to begin, and anticipate in practice what
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Furthermore, a new edition of Schelling’s collected works is currently being prepared by the Bayern
Academy of Sciences.
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Schelling will later say in The Ages of the World: the beginning is always an eternal
beginning, so that any and all beginning can never truly begin or end. And yet, although
Schelling acknowledges in the Ages the eternal quality of beginning, beginning always
desires and longs for an end, so much so that a beginning must try and find a point at
which to begin; having once begun, beginning searches desperately for its end. Unlike the
Ages, the First Outline is a text less concerned with how it begins, opting for a beginning
that comes before the text, so that it thus experiments with what it presents as something
already having begun or always already beginning. Yet the separate publication of the
First Outline and the Introduction shows that beginning is not as simple or
uncomplicated as these texts would have one believe. Analysis of the First Outline forces
one to choose where the reading begins, all the while accepting that beginning from
either the Introduction or the First Outline always already implies a gap that is
fundamental to and prior to when and where either text posits their beginning.
Yet due to this irresolvable problem of beginning–the problem that plagued
Schelling for his whole life and continues to plague any approach to reading him–it does
not matter which text one begins reading, because beginning is that which has already
come before, insofar as it is already in the process of trying to begin again. That being
said, why not begin with the Introduction, since it, in terms of its more generally accepted
architectural position within texts, is that which wishes to be read first? But because it is
that which desires to be read first, to be made the first priority over the text which it
introduces, and because it presents itself in a seamless relationship or in a “most complete
fusion” (Schelling FO 193) with the First Outline, the Introduction positions itself as the
authoritative text that ‘speaks’ the true intentions of the author, when in fact the
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Introduction exists apart and completely distinct from the First Outline not only in terms
of its publication history but also in terms of its content and architectonic structure.
For while the Introduction presents itself alongside the First Outline, it is more
aligned with texts that are more traditionally associated with transcendental idealism,
which is at once clear if we look at the language Schelling uses at the very beginning of
the text. Words such as “intelligence”, “ideal world”, “genius”, “consciousness”, and
“identity” (Schelling Introduction 193) are borrowed from Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason (“[a]nalytical judgments (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection
of the predicate with the subject is conceived through identity,” [Kant A7/B10; my
emphasis] and Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, “The nature of intelligence consists in this
immediate unity of being and seeing” [Fichte 17; my emphasis]). Furthermore, these
words are also more appropriate to the language Schelling uses in the System of
Transcendental Idealism (1800) than to the language that is more specific to the First
Outline. The language and rhetoric of transcendental idealism assumes a knowledge of
what philosophy is, and, furthermore, assumes that the real should be subordinated to the
ideal: “Since philosophy assumes the unconscious, or as it may likewise be termed, the
real activity to be identical with the conscious or ideal, its tendency will be to bring back
everywhere the real to the ideal–a process which gives rise to what is called
transcendental philosophy” (Schelling Introduction 193). The immediate demand made
by philosophy, which is more specifically transcendental philosophy, is to make identical
that which is already separated into the real and the ideal without showing why this
imperative simply assumes that there is a perfect complementarity between these opposed
realms of philosophy.
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The first truth of the Introduction, therefore, is not presented as a truth but as an

assumption, and this assumption continues with regard to the “transition from a fluid to a
solid state,” the existence of “regular forms,” and a symmetrical existence that not only
connects nature to consciousness but to “external works of art, perfect in their kind”
(Schelling Introduction 194; my emphasis). What becomes evident in the difference
between the Introduction and the First Outline is that none of these stated truths are
uncomplicated; neither are they systematically worked out as concepts as they would be
in a work that actually completes and grounds the “system” of transcendental idealism.
The Introduction, then, deserves the criticism which Hegel laid against Schelling in his
Lectures on the History of Philosophy (1825-26):
What is lacking in Schelling’s philosophy is thus the fact that the point of
indifference of subjectivity and objectivity, or the Notion of reason, is absolutely
pre-supposed, without any attempt being made at showing that this is the truth.
Schelling often uses Spinoza’s form of procedure, and sets up axioms. In
philosophy, when we desire to establish a position, we demand proof. But if we
begin with intellectual intuition, that constitutes an oracle to which we have to
give way, since the existence of intellectual intuition was made our postulate.
(Hegel 525-526)
But, being so preoccupied with Schelling’s deployment of the absolute as a principle by
which one begins the system, Hegel cannot see the forest for the trees. Schelling, always
the more enthusiastic German Idealist of the two, may seem to hastily connect the
philosophy of nature with transcendental idealism, immediately “subordinat[ing] the real
to the ideal” (Schelling Introduction 194), but makes it “the task of the philosophy of
nature to explain the ideal by the real” (Schelling ibid.). By turning “two sciences” into
“one science, differentiated only in the opposite orientation of their tasks” (Schelling
Introduction 194), Schelling complicates the initial order of things which was previously
established within the limits of transcendental philosophy. Once Schelling equates nature
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with consciousness, neither nature nor consciousness can any longer account for the
ground of its existence on its own terms, irrevocably transporting the grounds upon which
both philosophies were founded into unknown areas of inquiry. Each, then, must be
written, or re-written, by the other. If “everything in Nature is necessary merely because
it is only through the medium of such a nature that self-consciousness can take place”
(Schelling Introduction 194), self-consciousness becomes entirely dependent on the
successful completion of the philosophy of nature, and vice versa. Consciousness, then,
must think its body not as a limitation to thought but as crucially necessary for the
possibility of thought in the first place, thereby disclosing that the possibility of thought
arises as a result of thought’s unthought, unconscious beginnings.
The philosophy of nature, therefore, disrupts the seamless and authoritative selfassurance of transcendental philosophy forever by tying both philosophies’ outcomes
together. And yet it is unclear whether this braid that Schelling begins to weave between
these two separate philosophies can use transcendental philosophy as the third strand that
will complete the approach towards the absolute; indeed, it is unclear whether or not the
Naturphilosophie and transcendental idealism are even separate or identical in the same
way that Schelling will later take these up in the Ages project. In fact, it is evident in
Schelling’s writing that there is always a gap between these two philosophies, and any
unity that is posited is either something yet to be completed and lies in the future or is a
unity that is hastily asserted in bad faith; for if transcendental philosophy has its own
methods for thinking the absolute, and those methods are incommensurable with the
philosophy of nature (Schelling Introduction 194), the philosophy of nature turns out to
be distinct and not complementary to transcendental philosophy’s grasp of the absolute.
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If the philosophy of nature is as Schelling says, “an invasion of Nature” but also “an
experiment” (Schelling Introduction 197), then how self-assured can transcendental
philosophy be of its own scientific methods that contribute to the achievement of selfconsciousness?
The science, or rather the technique, employed in both philosophies is revealed in
the First Outline to be a science that is experimental rather than a self-evident and
totalizing practice, and that only comes into being out of its own self-organization.
Organization, therefore, becomes the third term by which these two philosophies are
linked, as the Introduction and the System reveal their obsession with how organization
organizes the parts that make up the whole. And yet organization in the Introduction is
expressed as a priori, “[f]or if, in an organic whole, all things mutually bear and support
each other, then this organization must have existed as a whole previous to its parts; the
whole could not have arisen from the parts” (Schelling Introduction 198). In other words,
Nature could not be being itself, at once both product and productivity, if it was not selfsustaining. But, in the First Outline, organization becomes problematized by its noncoexistence with itself, revealing that all systems are dependent upon contradiction, or
upon an “asystaton, something non-coexistent” (qd. Grant Philosophies of Nature 1).
Therefore, while Nature is rhetorically deployed as the means to organize the beings, the
parts, or the organs that make up the whole of its organized body, the speculative nature
of the First Outline is not complete as a purely empirical analysis of nature, because that
would imply that the First Outline “regards its object in being, as something already
prepared and accomplished” (Schelling Introduction 201).
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The organization Schelling prefers for the First Outline above empiricism is

science, which, as has been shown above, is an experimental practice. In opposition to
empiricism, Schelling defines science as that which “views its object in becoming, and as
something that has yet to be accomplished . . . it must set out from the unconditioned”
(Schelling Introduction 201). However, since nature is both product and productivity,
Schelling still requires a dual vision that sees nature in becoming in relation to nature in
its simple products. “Nature,” writes Schelling, “as a mere product (natura naturata) we
call Nature as object (with this alone empiricism deals). Nature as productivity (natura
naturans) we call Nature as subject (with this alone all theory deals)” (Schelling
Introduction 203). Nature’s organization is always split by the contradiction inherent to
Schelling’s speculative project of the totality of objects; since he tries to maintain a view
that balances empiricism and science, objects and totality, or the multitude and the
singular within the organization of nature, the First Outline works through empiricism
not as the appearance of “mere products” but views them as ungrounded products in
becoming. In this sense, the First Outline is not a transcendental idealist text, insofar as it
maintains a relation of the transcendental to its material existence. This makes for a
transcendental materialism or a “theoretical empiricism,” as Rajan argues5, which cannot
extricate itself from its correlation and therefore can never rightly be called self-same.
Because the First Outline exposes the ungroundedness of the Idealist conception
of organization by means of a transcendental empiricism, the concept of organization that
is developed in System of Transcendental Idealism must be put under erasure. This is
problematic, for in the System as in the First Outline empiricism remains suspect as that
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which merely intuits “everything entering the intelligence from without, [and] in fact
explains, the nature of intelligence in a purely mechanical fashion” (Schelling System
123). However, although the First Outline also sees empiricism in a similar fashion, it
must still turn to empiricism in order to ground its speculations on the transcendental or
theoretical productivity of nature. Therefore, if we hold up the First Outline to the System
as a mirror, these mutually unground each other, insofar as the First Outline shows the
System needs empiricism in order to ground itself, while the System shows the First
Outline the necessity of an organizing theoretical figure without which the empirical
would then become meaningless and arbitrary.
But what is absent from the First Outline’s conception of organization and yet is
present in the System’s is the rhetorical manipulation of the categorical limitations
assigned to empiricism, which conveys a seamless complementarity between the
intelligence and the universe. However, this fearless symmetry between the universe as
macrocosm and self-consciousness as microcosm is dependent upon the imposed relation
that connects the general concept of organization to the particular and individual concept
of the organ.
Yet if the intelligence is organic at all, as indeed it is, it has also framed to itself
outwardly from within everything that is external for it, and that which constitutes
the universe for it is merely the grosser and remoter organ of self-consciousness,
just as the individual organism is the finer and more immediate organ thereof.
(Schelling System 123)
As it stands, organization is deployed as a synecdoche of the external manifestation of
internal organs in order to at once affirm and conceal the gap that underwrites the radical
diremption6 between the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of transcendental
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idealism; organization therefore is strategically deployed to concretize the transcendental
idealist project by subordinating nature to consciousness. The System presents
organization in more transcendentally idealist terms, so that what at once organizes
outside also operates upon and within the dialectical relation between the universe and
the intelligence as a third principle that contains and legitimates the gradual succession of
the universe towards the attainment of self-consciousness. Organization, then, is tied up
with the linear discourse of history, since, as Schelling writes in the System, “succession
must become objectified to it as organization, which is the first solution of our problem,
as to how the intelligence intuits itself as productive” (Schelling System 123). In this way,
organization is employed in order to contain the universe within the mind by internalizing
that which is external, providing a rhetorical ground by which the intelligence may
proclaim its productivity to be distinct from, as well as higher than, the productivity of
the universe.
Gone unquestioned, organization performs the role of a vanishing mediator that
slips into the text and allows for one to slip over it, supplementing the concepts of
intelligence, nature, succession, and history so that each can reflect onto each other a
positive and real relation.
[A]s the succession proceeds, organization too will achieve a greater extension,
and depict within itself a larger portion of the universe. This will thus provide a
graduated sequence running parallel to the development of the universe. The law
of this sequence is that organization constantly enlarges its scope as the
intelligence constantly extends it. (Schelling System 123)
The extension of organization therefore means the simultaneous extension of the
intelligence insofar as each mutually constructs the other, which Schelling uses to
establish the narrative of a seamless progression of the universe into “one chain”
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(Schelling Introduction 207). Only if the history of the mind and the history of the
universe were perfectly reflected in each other in one perfect organization, could one
really admit the completion of the idealist project. But, since the ground of organization
itself turns out to be ungrounded, it becomes obvious that Schelling characterized it as a
priori only in order to fulfill a linear and positivist completion of history that the System
sets up as the end goal of Idealism. This is accomplished by the way that Schelling writes
out this idea of organization as the figure that envelopes all of time and space; however,
organization is not actual but is rather a metaphorical representation of organization as a
mirror that reflects so that “the intelligence [can intuit] the evolution of the universe, so
far as this falls within its intuition, in terms of an organization, [so that] it will intuit this
latter as identical with its own self” (Schelling System 122). Organization, though, is not
a static illustration, a mirror, or a tool; on the contrary, organization, like nature in the
First Outline, exists only in the process of its own becoming, and is never at any point
complete, for it is infinitely organizing itself towards a point of indifference it cannot
reach. Organization as a principle cannot even guarantee the trajectory of its own
organizing, since the rhetorical reliance and emphasis that Shelling’s writing lays upon it
in the Introduction and the System only belies its auto-immune character in the First
Outline. While transcendental idealism tries to organize the subjective and objective
realms together into a synthetic point of unity, the project of the First Outline, that is,
that which is carried out by means of speculative physics is very much a part of the
braiding of these two philosophies together in which each of these furthers and
ungrounds the other, occupying itself with the ungrounded “original causes of motion in
Nature” (Schelling Introduction 196). Even within the Introduction, there is a subjacent
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anxiety over whether speculative philosophy can complete the chain of history, as
Schelling questions the certainty of the project of speculative physics:
Now, we may indeed be quite certain that every natural phenomenon, through
whatever number of intermediate links, stands in connection with the last
conditions of Nature. . . . Speculative physics has nothing to do but to show the
need of these intermediate links; but since every new discovery throws us back
upon a new ignorance, and while one knot is being loosed a new one is being tied,
it is conceivable that the complete discovery of all the intermediate links in the
chain of Nature, and therefore also our science itself, is an infinite task. (Schelling
Introduction 199)
In this sense, the Introduction becomes a site of transition that tries to perform both the
discourses of the First Outline and the System in one text. This results in a disfiguration
of both discourses, demonstrating how the encounter between both these texts mutually
ungrounds each of them and ultimately puts the organization of both texts under erasure.
1. 4 Writing Nature Otherwise
	
  
Jumping over the gap which separates the Introduction from the First Outline, we
return once again to the opening lines of the “Outline of the Whole”: “Because to
philosophize about nature means as much as to create it, we must first of all find the point
from which nature can be posited into becoming” (Schelling First Outline 5). From the
outset the First Outline already encounters its first insurmountable obstacle, the point, or
the moment, from which nature begins. This results from Nature’s determinate identity.
Nature, as Schelling defines it, is “BEING ITSELF” (Schelling First Outline 13); it is at
once both the infinite production and absolute inhibition of itself. Yet how did nature as
unconditioned and pure productivity ever encounter such a radical and absolute inhibition
that could have resulted in the first point of becoming? It turns out, as David Farrell Krell
notes, that “Schelling is never able to answer these questions, each of which circles about
the very problem he calls “insoluble.” What he learns repeatedly is that heterogeneity can
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never be merely “introduced” into homogeneity” (Krell Tragic Absolute 50). It is
precisely because of this circular rotation around this insoluble problem that Schelling’s
First Outline immediately overturns homogeneity in favour of heterogeneity, although
the text still calls for the process of heterogeneity to end. For once the text has begun, its
beginning is always eternally beginning, so that the text calls out for that homogeneous
point to put an end to nature’s endless productivity. Whereas some may point to nature as
being this unified point, since Schelling represents nature as the point of identity between
both productivity and product, the First Outline is unable to convincingly demonstrate
that point at which heterogeneity transitions into absolute homogeneity. This duality
inherent to nature gives way to a writing of nature in the First Outline that unworks the
progressive history and organization that is ascribed to nature, evolution, and productivity
by writing a nature that is at odds with itself and is not self-same but is in fact neverending.
This is to say that the kind of productivity seen in the First Outline does not
proceed according to the rationale that narrates the unfolding of nature’s progress; rather,
nature rejects rationality in favour of an irrational overproduction that wildly exceeds the
limits which the text imposes to guide nature towards the archetype of some absolute
organism. This overproduction is reflected in the writing of the text, in the excessive and
profligate production of footnotes, questions, and re-formulations that intersperse the
reading, which interrupts, in the words of Georges Bataille, the “restricted economy”
which the text appears to write and reveals the more “general economy” that the text’s
architectonic actually presents7. These footnotes are, in the words of Jean-Luc Nancy,
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In Georges Bataille’s The Accursed Share, he writes of the difference between general and restricted
economies: “There can be anguish only from a personal, particular point of view that is radically opposed
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“expressions” or Remarks that are not merely summed up as appendices to the text.
Instead, Nancy writes,
[a]n economy of Remarks seems to double up the economy of logical discourse:
an economy of remarks, that is, a subordinated “detached” dispersed economy
that does not obey the strict progression of the concept but rather chance
encounters between the text and the good or (ill) fortunes of the writer” (Nancy
Speculative Remark 48).
These footnotes also serve a second purpose, insofar as they are a manifestation of the
text’s écriture that reflects the volatile and ever-shifting trajectory of nature’s wildly
deranged production. Though Schelling may have failed to answer the question from
whence did nature begin, the way nature is philosophically written and developed
unworks and dislodges it from the discourse of transcendental idealism that limits its
auto-genesis, inviting the reader to read nature otherwise and discover the limitless
potential that once lay subjacent, dark, and hidden within it.
1. 5 Natural History
The First Outline’s architectonic is spread out among three divisions: the first
deals with a discussion of nature as the absolute, the second with the elucidation of three
possible systems of anorganic nature, and the third explains John Brown’s theory of
excitability. Through these, Schelling presents nature as an activity that can be deduced
as a “dynamic graduated series of stages” (Schelling First Outline 54) and hence be given
to thought as a “natural history” (Schelling First Outline 44). But, as the divisions within
the text itself show, Schelling is incapable of writing out this natural history
systematically, for the First Outline is rather an assemblage of disparate articulations
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
to the general point of view based on the exuberance of living matter as a whole. Anguish is meaningless
for someone who overflows with life, and for life as a whole, which is an overflowing by its very nature”
(Bataille The Accursed Share 39).
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about nature than it is a coherent history of successive stages of development.
Nevertheless, as opposed to Kant, who imagines natural history as a history of objects
that places them within a certain time and place in nature, Schelling figures the concept
of natural history in terms later developed by Joseph Henry Green, a British Idealist
thinker, who introduces the idea of thinking nature through “physiogony.” Physiogony,
according to Green, is,
the history of nature, which studies this history as “preface and portion of the
history of man,” so as to make the “knowledge of Nature” a “branch of selfknowledge” (103). . . . For Green physiogony becomes anthropology, as he
subsumes the history of nature into a temporalized Chain of Being in which
nature works her way up from “the polypi to the mammalia,” “labour[ing] in birth
with man” (101–6). (Rajan “Excitability” 315-316)
This approach to natural history, on the other hand, remains tied up with the project of
transcendental idealism developed in the System, which views nature as a “primordial
original” that is at once both free in the actions of the products it produces and necessary
“through the confinement and conformity to law inherent in her” (Schelling System 199).
Yet, as opposed to the System, Tilottama Rajan writes, “[n]ot only is this text hardly a
system so much as an assemblage, and thus a dissension or ‘strife’ of systems” (Rajan
“Excitability” 317); the First Outline’s attempts to “fit” or “sublate” history, empiricism
and various sciences–such as those developed by John Brown, J. H. Green, and Johann
Christian Reil–into a writing of spirit through nature, results in Schelling finding these
sciences writing spirit (Rajan “Excitability 317). The text, therefore, offers the reader an
instance of what Hegel had said of Schelling, that he “worked out his philosophy in view
of the public” (Hegel Lectures 513), since the text boldly and visibly divulges its
experimental style, allowing the public to view nature’s very real struggle with its own
becoming. Reading nature in the First Outline in a straightforward manner becomes
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nearly impossible, for reading is led through a series of dissensions, inner conflicts, and
contradictions that end up dissolving any progression that would amount to an end. This
results in the dissolution of the architectonic of a “dynamic graduated series of stages,”
set up by Schelling to guide the text, into the indifferent fluid and luxurious development
that is written out in the philosophy of nature.
The natural history which the text intends to write out is therefore undermined by
the formless and infinite productivity of nature, which Schelling wrote in order to
circumvent the traditional analysis of nature according to empiricism in favour of a
construction of nature that metaphysically encapsulates it as both product and
productivity. It is impossible to “know nature as product,” Schelling writes, for nature is
known “only as active”; since “being itself is = to activity, then the individual being
cannot be an absolute negation of activity” (Schelling First Outline 14). This perspective
on nature is afforded by the intuition of it as an infinite product, since no finite product
can provide actual knowledge of nature as both pure product and pure productivity. If
nature cannot be empirically determined except through an “empirically infinite series,”
then it can only be “presented by infinite becoming” (Schelling First Outline 15). Nature,
as that which straddles the line between being and nothing, as a principle of being, that
itself is not, and yet “manifests itself in each natural object” (Schelling First Outline 13)
is therefore neither merely being nor nothing, but slips imperceptibly into becoming as
that which has already been. The reason for this is that Schelling cannot pinpoint when
nature began in the same way that Nancy describes Hegel as not being able to pinpoint
when it is that the Aufehbung begins, since “[i]t has always been too early or too late for
determining. . . . [T]he whole logic of sublation has occurred in the sliding of a word and

	
  

	
  

29

in the slipping of the text on this word” (Nancy Speculative Remark 40). Speculative
philosophy can only assume that the book of nature is and has always presently been in
the process of its own becoming, and, henceforth, ascribes to nature the quality of infinite
becoming, as it could not be otherwise thought or unthought.
In the same way that Nature can only ever imperceptibly enter into becoming, so
too does philosophy only enter into nature by means of a free “invasion,” for, as
Schelling writes, “it would certainly be impossible to get a glimpse of the internal
construction of Nature if an invasion of Nature were not possible through freedom”
(Schelling First Outline 196). That is, philosophy enters freely into its theorization of the
absolute as nature by means of the freedom of speculative philosophy. Through
speculative philosophy, as an experimental writing, Schelling writes that nature is at once
infinite productivity and the absolute product. Yet if we consider this creation of nature
as at once a theorization as well as a writing of nature, an analogous question emerges
between the two: how does one account for the permanence of objects in nature
considered as absolute productivity or how does one account for the emergence of a text
from the infinite process of writing? Schelling’s tenuous answer lies in the relation
between the encounter of two opposed operations, processes, or what Schelling calls
“tendencies” in nature,
Let one force be thought, originally infinite in itself, streaming out in all
directions from one central point; then this force will not linger in any point of
space for a moment (thus leaving space empty), unless an energetic activity
opposing (retarding) its expansion did not give it a finite velocity). . . . [It] must
be assumed that no product in nature can be the product in which those opposed
activities absolutely coincide, i.e., in which Nature itself attained rest. One must,
in a word, simply deny all permanence in Nature itself. (Schelling First Outline
17).
The appearance of products in nature, according to Schelling, simulates an apparent
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permanence that conceals the productivity that lies behind it. The object, then, becomes
for nature the limit of nature as subject (for nature as subject is always taken to mean
nature as productivity, activity, becoming). The object, “the resting, permanent,”
therefore, becomes the “chief problem of the philosophy of nature” (Schelling First
Outline 17), as it is that which inconceivably inhibits nature as productivity. This
opposition is not at all peaceful but is rather highly antagonistic and violent. Nature is
“impetuous” in its retardation, and infinitely struggles against the products that appear in
opposition to it. Therefore, nature attempts to “fill anew” each determinate product in an
incessant “gush[ing]” of its force, but is forever traumatized by its encounter with its
resistance, and is unable to overcome the dissenting voice that opposes it.
The traumatic character of this opposition is more clearly expressed in one of the
footnotes appended to the text, where Schelling conceives of nature as a stream that
“flows in a straight line forward as long as it encounters no resistance”; yet “[w]here
there is resistance–a whirlpool forms,” wherein every “original product of nature is such
a whirlpool, every organism” (Schelling First Outline 18). The whirlpool, like the
organism, is never immobile or permanent, but is something “constantly transforming”
and is said to be constantly reproduced at each moment by the vivifying force of nature.
However, the whirlpool does not reflect the discourse of the main text. Instead, these
whirlpools that are in constant transformation demonstrate that the main text is itself not a
restricted economy but is rather more general; although the footnotes appear separate and
distinct from the main text, they interact with and still belong to the economy of the text
by doubling it. In the same way as when the activity of nature encounters a whirlpool and
leaves that “stream of Nature’s activity . . . broken” or, even more traumatically,
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“annihilated” (Schelling First Outline 18), the footnotes unwork the operation of nature
as “pure identity” by redirecting its production and reciprocally derange it. This footnote,
like many others in the text, involutes the stream downwards inside the unfathomable
depths of its resistance against the text and then sends the stream back outwards, not as it
was before, but transformed and changed. In this way, the footnotes pose a threat to the
“organic totality” of the main text, putting the authority–as both the government and
author of the text–of nature under erasure. Instead of clarifying the main text, the
footnotes frustrate the trajectory of the text, and demonstrate that, like the whirlpools, the
text is not a composite organization but a “whole of articulated singularities.” Moreover,
as Nancy would say, “[a]rticulation does not mean organization,” since “by itself” it is
rather “a juncture, or more exactly the play of the juncture” (Nancy Inoperative
Community 76). In this way, every product is a singularity that is articulated by
something that does not actually participate or guarantee the organization of products, but
merely assumes, plays with, or slides these distinct and incommensurable pieces of
nature’s puzzle–product versus productivity–together in an experiment hoping for good
results.
The figure that Schelling introduces in order to inhibit and guide the text’s
overproduction is the figure of the originary actants. Within the hierarchy of principles
presented within the text the actants appear lower than the higher principle of nature; they
too do not exist in space and, like nature, are originary productivities as well; however,
actants cannot amount to nature even if all of them were amassed together, since they are
at once originary productivities that are “truly singular”; each is “in itself whole and
sealed-off, and represents, as it were, a natural monad” (Schelling First Outline 21).
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Schelling’s naturalization of the Leibnizian monad is here used to construct a multiplicity
of singularities that are both individual and “inconstructible” because they are the “limit
of all construction by virtue of which every construction is a determinate one” (Schelling
First Outline 22). As such, actants provide the simple originary principle by which nature
as infinite productivity can transfer its absolute force into restricted forces, determinate
articulations, or propositions that are the substrate of all material products, much like the
Higgs-Boson in quantum physics that provides the field that gives matter its mass.
Actants, therefore, are not the originary force but are the mediate principles that transmit
this force as “alterations” (Schelling First Outline 22) of that force, “alterations–of
cohesive force, of density, of specific gravity” (Schelling First Outline 23). These
alterations, however, only exist because they have previously formed into one unified
inhibition that resists the originary force of nature, opposing to it a collective activity to
“strive toward one and the same product” (Schelling First Outline 24) and modify the
originary force of nature into something different. The actants, then, present the natural
inhibition required for nature to enter into becoming, so that the indifferent activity of
productive nature encounters the necessary difference of multiple and individual
productivities that complete nature as the most original duality. In this sense, the actants’
relationship to nature as the inhibitive concept that sets nature into becoming is much like
the notion of the “violence” of writing in Derrida and Paul de Man’s sense of
deconstruction, insofar as writing is always an activity or a force that moves towards the
creation of something out of nothing; writing is that which excludes that which comes
before it as a force that does not merely negate it but makes it the possibility for
production. Nature’s productivity can never actually be since it requires the actants to
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recover productivity from its fundamental excessiveness and then direct these into
formations, into words, or what are also known as the apparent products of nature.
Actants, in this sense, perform a second function by organizing and dispensing
the infinite productivity of nature into restricted and yet mutual channels that Schelling
can later use in order to initiate the economy of the graduated stages of nature, “[f]or two
different actants, there must be one common point in which they unite–(this point will be
named–at a much lower level to be sure–the chemical product)” (Schelling First Outline
24). And yet, as soon as the concept of the actant is articulated, it is undone by yet
another footnote. The spectral nature of the actant as an inhibitive and productive point in
the system is revealed once Schelling further questions the possibility of investigating the
reality of the actants: “but the question is by what means these alterations have been
produced, and this has not been answered by any previous research; and that question lies
far higher–and yet deeper, and ultimately in the construction of matter” (Schelling First
Outline 23). Insofar as the actants are the principle that explains how matter can come to
occupy space, as the writing that writes the words of the book of nature, it is ironic that
the remark makes the origin of the actants dependent upon the answer to the paradox of
materiality. In the same way as writing only exists insofar as it is in the process, in the
activity of writing, the actants can only be insofar as we consider them in tandem with the
construction of matter. The actants and matter then are mutually constructive and
deconstructive, as the footnote unworks the trajectory of the text and tangles any distinct
determination of firstness and secondness between productivity and product, since the
question of materiality presses in upon the text too early for the text to process or digest
it. While the main text is still in the midst of articulating itself, the articulation of the
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actant is seized by the voice of the footnote, which interrupts the temporal progression
that would see nature exit out of the realm of pure productivity into the specific
productivities of the actants that sustain the creation of the products or the matter of
nature.
1. 6 The Paradox of the Product
As it turns out, when Schelling had said that the chief problem of the philosophy
of nature was the problem of “rest” or “permanence,” he did not mean that since nature is
already known to be active, we must account for where the idea of permanence
originates. Definitely not. Rather, permanence, rest, and the heterogeneity of matter
become the chief problem for the philosophy of nature since they are that which
interrupts, eludes, and complicates the exposition of nature as simultaneously that which
is absolute productivity and product. Whenever nature must account for the existence of
matter, it is shown to be in dis-union with itself, throwing the concept of a totalizable
organization into dissolution. The only option left for the philosopher of nature is to
repress the gap that separates nature from its product, evidenced by yet another footnote
that addresses the question of how to “find the point in which this infinite multiplicity of
diverse actants can be unified in Nature” (Schelling First Outline 24). It is revealed that
the “dynamical philosophy cannot even arrive at this problem” since it is not concerned
with the “constituents” that make up the product of nature, because it assumes “the
constituents are given through the product. The dynamist, therefore, does not ask how the
product originates from these constituents; for the product precedes the constituents”
(Schelling First Outline 24). But, as the footnote demonstrates, the articulation of
precedence does not reflect the reality of the unfolding of nature, nor does it authorize the
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sovereignty of nature over its product. Thus, the remark, like matter, slips into the
temporal and hierarchical organization of the text where it rhetorically should not belong
but unquestionably exists.
Suspending for a moment the voice of the footnotes that consistently point to the
unexplained “cause of the force of cohesion” (Schelling First Outline 26) that unites the
actants into one absolute inhibition of nature’s productivity, let us turn to the way that
Schelling writes out the combination of actants as providing once again another
derangement of the whole organization of the text. In a remark Schelling describes the
cohesive force of nature as a “composite force” that is itself distinct from the “attractive
force” that attracts the actants towards each other. Cohesion “strives against the
universality of the attractive force, for it constantly individualizes and leaves the space
outside the sphere within which it alone works empty” (Schelling First Outline 26).
Granted that the force of cohesion cannot be accounted for, Schelling experiments with
the idea that the totality of actants are organizable into a single unified action but remain
individually distinct and free from each other. This, however, is maintained in order to
sustain a rhetoric of regulative formation that imposes upon nature “a continual
determination of figure from the crystal to the leaf, from the leaf to the human form”
(Schelling First Outline 26), which follows the physiogonic history that establishes a
typological continuity between nature as that which prefigures the fulfilled figure of man
as the apex of creation. Yet, typology goes unfulfilled as each actant “deranges” the other
in the same way that the footnotes derange nature’s approach towards the “production of
the originary figure” (Schelling First Outline 26-27). The result of this mutual
derangement in
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the most original and most absolute combination of opposed actions in Nature [is]
the most original fluidity, which. . . presents itself as a universally extended entity
that simply works against nonfluidity (solidity), and continually endeavors to
liquefy everything in Nature. (Schelling First Outline 27)
It is, therefore, that nature has finally produced its first, its most original product,

the fluid, insofar as it is that “which comes nearest to pure productivity,” since, as
Schelling writes, “[the] nearer Nature is to pure productivity the more formless, the
nearer to the product, the more formed” (Schelling First Outline 27). Fluidity negates all
individuation, having no desire or need to form into anything determinate, and hence
must be the first product since it is the furthest distance from the absolute product. As
such, the fluid is opposed to the actants, which remain individual and completely sealed
off, and the opposition between the two furnishes “the drama of a struggle between form
and formless” (Schelling First Outline 28). Pitted against each other in eternal opposition,
actant and fluid dialectically provide the ground for the becoming of nature, since nature
can never fall into absolute fluidity nor can it collapse into an absolute solidity. This
endless struggle is the theatrical performance of the history of the “various stages of
development of one and the same absolute organism,” which Schelling aptly calls an
“ever-changing Proteus” (Schelling First Outline 28). The philosophy of nature therefore
posits a positive sea change in the future, hoping that the absolute organism will at one
point resolve its duality and put itself to rest. Yet, as is known in Greek mythology,
Proteus, the god of the sea change, changes his shape in order to avoid telling the future,
not so that he may reveal it.
Therefore, it is appropriate that Schelling attributes the title of “ever-changing
Proteus” to nature, for it expresses the unpredictability and instability of the absolute
organism as a body without organs. Like the whirlpool and the fluid, Proteus represents
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the unruliness of metaphorical language that Schelling experimentally uses to organize
the disparate elements of the text and articulate nature as a process in infinite becoming.
Yet the writing of these figures is caught in the same infinite transmutations that
characterize nature in the same way as the whirlpools are in constant transformation.
Each represents another instance of the eternal beginning that tries to collect and present
an order of things but lacks the rule and order of history, since the text delays its moment
of unification for a time posited well into the future but which the text itself cannot
presently resolve. In this sense, the constant transformation and unrest of nature as pure
productivity as well as pure product resembles the writing of the text itself, a writing of
nature that cannot find its end once it begins, unleashing upon Schelling, as the writer, a
boundless object that repeatedly rejects the limits or directions which he tries to carefully
inscribe and re-inscribe. As nature reveals itself to be non-coexistent with itself, so too
does the text reveal to us the readers its own incommensurable and split identity.
This split, therefore, becomes the problem that Schelling encounters with the
guiding structure of the stages of development, which posits a future at rest that is united
in the completion of itself as absolute product. Each stage of development is written as
contained within the gamut of development from the lowest to the highest stage,
providing a proportion of the determinate permutations of each organism that leads up to
the production of the absolute product. But because Nature, as has been noted above,
detests the individual, viewing each as “misbegotten attempts” (Schelling First Outline
35) towards the final evolved product, nature as pure productivity constantly strives to
eliminate the products which it produces. However, this antagonism against the
individual arises only in the context of Nature’s commitment to the project of the stages
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of nature, which is not necessarily an anthropology, but is rather characteristic of the
indifference and frigidity of a totalitarian history. While it is true that Nature struggles
against each product and must tarry with the necessary process of formation that grounds
the generation of individuals, once the individual reaches the stage of sexual, and hence
reproductive, formation, Schelling writes that “[t]he development of the sexes is merely
the highest zenith of the process of formation, for it occurs by means of the same
mechanism through which progressive growth actually takes place” (Schelling First
Outline 37). The life of the individual, therefore, may mean very little from a cosmic
point of view, as it is reducible to merely a transition of forces that intensify within it and
then dissipate out into nature. And yet, once the individual reaches the point of sexual
maturity, it has, in that moment, reached the apex of its own formation as the highest
expression of Nature and from then on assumes the destiny of its own reproduction. The
individual, therefore, represents yet again the infinite work of writing, insofar as “[e]ach
product of nature can split again into new products,” since “Nature organizes, where it
organizes, to infinity” (Schelling First Outline 44). The autonomy of the individual
represents, in this sense, the autonomy of the text as an unfixed product whose split
identity divides and is reproduced infinitely in a reading that is never at once finished but
forever reproduces into ever-narrowing spheres of interpretation.
What Schelling’s writing thus points to is the impossibility of any point from
which one can write the beginning or the end of the history of nature. The First Outline
expresses a translinear rather than a unilinear direction towards the absolute product that
completely undoes the writing of the reproductive potential of the absolute organism. The
First Outline thus provides a completely different process as opposed to the one imposed
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upon it by the Introduction, a process of dissent that elicits new forms and new
individuals which inhibit the process of nature’s self-organization. If to philosophize
about nature, then, amounts to creating it, the First Outline, written as it was in the midst
of the Introduction and the System, emerges as a singular and idiosyncratic writing that is
auto-deconstructive of its legislative position, demanding a submission of nature to its
own profligate exchange between economies of restriction and excess, and which at no
point will see nature as productivity dominate over its eternally reproducing products.
At the end of our reading of this text, Schelling’s representation of Nature as a
linear stream with a beginning, a middle, and an end becomes insupportable. The figure
of nature as an absolute product or absolute organism turns out to be the absolute
expression of the overproduction and agglomeration of its whirlpooling products that are
forever transforming, deranging, and evolving out into nothingness or infinitude. If one
would, at this point, interpret the pathos of this writing of nature, it would be a nature that
wishes its book to end, a writing that seeks the respite of death in order to escape the at
once eternal but also bottomless suffering imposed upon it by its entrance into life. This
reading is as kind as it is cruel, for it seeks to take care of the text by letting itself be
transported to the writing, only in order to find the writing helpless as to the direction it is
taking itself. It is cruel on account of the reader’s helplessness to guide the text towards
its own avowed desire for its euthanasia, since to bestow the gift of death upon it would
be impossible; for there is not one unified organism for one to administer the hemlock
that would bring its wild thrashing, its twisted and agonized breathing, its deranged howls
to an end. Unable to point to its beginning, nature cannot find its end. As a result,
repression becomes the only means to carry on reading the history of nature as a history
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of the absolute organism. Yet repression was always at work in the writing of the text,
repressing the anarchy that resists and abstains from the work of order and history, which
simultaneously sustains the writing of any absolute organism. The duality at the core of
nature lies in writing, in language, and in the voice that speaks and philosophizes too, and
is necessarily repressed so as to write in the first place. The First Outline, then, as an
experimental and speculative draft unleashes this duality upon the text’s repressive
superstructure laid out in the Introduction, opening up for Schelling new possibilities
which he will write out in the Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human
Freedom and later in The Ages of the World.
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Keeping The World Within Bounds: Schelling’s Philosophical Investigations
Into the Essence of Human Freedom
2. 1 Introduction
“The only possible system of reason is pantheism” (Schelling Freedom 11), writes
Schelling at the beginning of the Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human
Freedom. Yet up until the writing of the Freedom essay in 1809, Schelling admits to
never having written a “complete, finished system. . . . but rather” to having “shown only
individual facets of such a system. . . . declar[ing] his works fragments of a whole”
(Schelling Freedom 5). Therefore, in 1809, Schelling seems to mark the Freedom essay
with the authority of a new beginning. Though as the last chapter showed, beginning for
Schelling is a troublesome moment that always appears to have begun, and is a point
which philosophy and writing always enter into in media res. This problem applies for
the beginning of the absolute in the Freedom essay as well. Slavoj Žižek writes that, on
the problem of beginning in both the Freedom essay and The Ages of the World, “with
regard to the mode of presentation of the Absolute, logical deduction has to give way to
mythical narrative” (Žižek The Indivisible Remainder 39). Here, Žižek’s point is that
beginning for Schelling and for German Idealism is always tied up with a
mythologization of the absolute, and that any beginning is always subject to the narrative
which the philosopher arbitrarily constructs. In order to begin, then, Schelling writes the
Freedom essay by means of the mythical narrative of the self-revelation of God, not in a
traditional or orthodox retelling, but in a radical re-conceptualization of the narrative and
écriture of theodicy and pantheism. Schelling meshes theodicy with pantheism, making
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all things immanent in and co-dependent with the existence of God, but he also re-figures
theodicy by turning evil into a necessary and actual force that is essential to God’s
coming-into-existence. In this sense, the world, the universe, and “man,” writes
Schelling, “[are] not outside of, but rather in, God and . . . [their] activity itself belongs to
the life of God” (Schelling Freedom 12).
Whereas theodicy is an important word for the Freedom essay, “pantheism” is
really the site or the word upon which the text and Schelling speculate, in the sense
developed by Jean-Luc Nancy in The Speculative Remark. Pantheism, for Schelling, is
one of those speculative words that surprises and has in itself a speculative meaning that
had not been understood until he had read it otherwise. Thus, pantheism becomes a
means of writing and thinking through the problem of the idea of God or of God as
beginning. Yet, pantheism is also used by Schelling in order to write over those gaps and
pockmarks of God’s self-revelation by writing pantheism side by side with theodicy and
God as figural seals, which function as ways of repressing the text’s aporetic and abyssal
narrative. The Freedom essay, thus, illustrates a different kind of writing than the
speculative and experimental writing of the First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of
Nature or The Ages of the World. The Freedom essay represents a site of anxiety over the
contingency of its own writing, and therefore represses the luxurious fluidity and
ungrounded speculative style of Schelling’s experimental writings. Instead, the writing of
the Freedom essay tries to impose continuity and linearity by using the figures of
pantheism, theodicy, and God; yet, in so doing, these also open the Freedom essay up to a
deconstructive reading. These figures do not provide the solution to the problem of
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writing, but rather unleash upon the Freedom essay problems which further complicate
its writing by initiating a return of the text’s repressed.
This chapter, then, begins by revisiting Schelling’s meditations on pantheism in
the Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism. There Schelling provides a
reading of criticism and dogmatism that writes and rethinks the relation between the two
philosophies in a way that he will once again take up in the Freedom essay’s figuration of
pantheism, theodicy, and God; however, I argue, the Philosophical Letters are themselves
a site of rupture and auto-immunity that will infect rather than seal off the Freedom essay
from its own contingent writing. The next section will seek to uncover the differences
between Spinoza and Schelling’s expositions of pantheism. Schelling’s adoption of
pantheism also impacts the writing of Schelling’s system, for, while the Freedom essay
represents a new beginning and a new way of thinking the question of the origin of
existence, pantheism and theodicy introduce problems that make both the figure of “God”
as writer as well as his author, Schelling, subject to their own deconstructive writing. The
writing of the Freedom essay uses the figures of theodicy and pantheism as a means to
evade the infinite task of writing that was at issue in the First Outline by means of the
text’s articulation of the authority of God; however, in order to write out a narrative of
theodicy, Schelling must inscribe within God a contradiction that must be resolved, that
is, the conflict between good and evil. This writing of the conflict of good and evil within
God opens a new rupture within the text, as the conflict of revelation subjects God to the
contingency and suffering of his ground, and radically disfigures a united and perfect
authority. For evil and good must equally be written since evil provides the necessary
means by which God’s self-revelation can come to be, and yet evil is always potentially
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capable of annihilating that revelation. This relationship between God as he is in Himself
and God as ground will thus occupy the third section of this chapter. God, I argue, is not
some transcendental signifier that authorizes the text, but a figure that the Freedom essay
constructs and deconstructs, since God is subject to the radical exposure of his own
writing and to the writing of the text. Schelling’s introduction of pantheism and theodicy
into his writing thus have the effect of opening the Freedom essay to the problems that
lay hidden within this new figuration of God, making God the figure by which the text
unbinds itself when it was supposed to be that which kept this world within bounds.
2. 2 The Philosophical Letters
	
  
The fact that the Freedom essay returns to pantheism and idealism is significant if
we consider its initial publication history. The essay, according to the editors of its most
recent publication, Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt, was published in 1809 alongside a
selection of Schelling’s other more idealist texts in Volume 1 “of what was to be a
collected edition of Schelling’s writings published by Phillip Krüll in Landshut”;
however no “further volumes were published” (Love and Schmidt Freedom 135). In the
recent 2006 printing of the essay, the editors have provided the preface to the collection
from 1809. There, because Schelling places these earlier idealist texts–which include the
Philosophical Letters–in continuity with the Freedom essay, the preface is, in a sense, a
site of self-reflexivity. This is to say that we can read the preface in a way that sees
Schelling insisting on a continuity between his texts, figuring each earlier work as an
instance that is part of his development towards the writing of the Freedom essay, the text
that “is the first which the author puts forth his concept of the ideal part of philosophy
with complete determinateness” (Schelling Freedom 4). The editors, on the other hand,
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state that Schelling’s “self-interpretation may seem somewhat disingenuous to those who
emphasize “Protean” discontinuity in Schelling’s work” (Love and Schmidt Freedom
136), but also that Schelling’s plea for continuity in his works should not be taken lightly.
Our reading chooses to posit itself somewhere in between these two interpretations by
placing the Philosophical Letters in continuity with the Freedom essay, but in a way that
emphasizes a continuity that itself is problematic as it opens both of these texts to their
own deconstruction. In this sense, this reading does not focus on the fact that Schelling
himself was protean, but that his writing was.
The Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, published in 1795,
consist of a series of ten letters addressed to a fictional and unnamed interlocutor who
serves as the audience of Schelling’s epistolary polemic. We have noted in the previous
chapter that Schelling elaborates in the Letters a nuanced and critical reading of Kant’s
critical philosophy and Spinoza’s enthusiastic dogmatism, positioning dogmatism as
criticism’s foil. The Letters also introduce a focus on pantheism that will continue in the
Freedom essay, making the Letters a methodological guide for reading the Freedom
essay as an ongoing dialogue between dogmatism (as enthusiasm) and criticism (as
absolute idealism). During the period of German Idealism, dogmatism and criticism were
important terms that were polemically charged for Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling and
meant different things for each of them. Generally for Fichte, and in a similar and yet
contrasting way for Kant8, dogmatism was equated with transcendental realism,
pantheism, and Spinoza, since dogmatism accounted for experience “from some
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While Schelling uses the words pantheism, idealism, dogmatism, and criticism, in the Freedom essay he
does not provide an elaborate or systematic definition of idealism in the same way as would Kant or Fichte.
For more information on the development of Idealism according to the main figures of German Idealism,
see Frederick Beiser’s German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism 1781-1801.
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transcendent principle beyond consciousness, the thing in itself (Ding an sich)”; on the
other hand, criticism or idealism, for Ficthe, was something associated with
consciousness and the capacity of the subject’s freedom to actualize its own existence,
positing experience “from some immanent principle within consciousness, the self, the
ego, or I in itself” (Beiser 261). However, Schelling does not see dogmatism or criticism
in the same way as did Kant or Fichte. He uses these terms speculatively, expressing
them as an opposing binary which he tries to dialectically work through rather than
establishing them as exclusive philosophical activities. Unlike Kant and Fichte, for whom
the argument of criticism becomes just as univocal as their opponent’s arguments for
dogmatism, Schelling establishes dogmatism and criticism in the Letters as figures which
are representative of the two philosophies of Spinoza and Kant that supplement each
other in the same way as pantheism and idealism do in the Freedom essay. While it was
traditional in German Idealism to equate pantheism with the words dogmatism and
realism or criticism with idealism and freedom, between the Letters and the Freedom
eassy we can read Schelling as trying to speculate on how to articulate these words in
radical new directions that unravel their more generally accepted meaning.
In the Letters, then, Schelling’s analysis focuses on the one point where
dogmatism and criticism must meet, which for each of them is the “same problem”: “the
riddle of the world, the question of how the absolute could come out of itself and oppose
to itself a world” (Schelling Letters 173-174). According to Schelling, God is not what is
in question, for God is an idea that cannot be forgotten and that must be approached by
theoretical reason, regardless of the timorous nature of Schelling’s interlocutor, to whom
Schelling responds critically: “You say that theoretical reason is not able to comprehend
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a God. So be it; but call it what you will–assumption, knowledge, belief–you cannot get
rid of the idea of God” (Schelling Letters 158). Rather, the question is how is it that God
reveals himself or what exactly the realm of the absolute is where both criticism and
dogmatism must meet; the question is what does it mean if “the principle which they
have so far presupposed, was nothing but a prolepsis” (Schelling Letters 175), or what
Schelling, loosely quoting Jacobi, also calls systematic philosophy’s “original
insuperable prejudices [Vorurteile]” (Schelling 176)? The Greek word prolepsis and the
German word Vorurteile both have the same meaning of a preconception, a prejudice, or
a prejudgment, which, for Schelling, means that the absolute is rather a site of
prejudgment or decision from which “all the propositions which they [criticism and
dogmatism] had put forth, thus far were propositions asserted absolutely, that is, without
ground” (Schelling Letters 175-176). The Letters is, therefore, a speculative text that
analyzes philosophy’s construction and deconstruction of the absolute, showing that the
absolute is not a fixed principle but rather, as the highest principle of a system of
criticism or dogmatism, has “only a subjective value as a basis of his [the philosopher’s]
system, that is, . . . [it is] valid for him only inasmuch as he anticipated his own practical
decision” (Schelling Letters 176). Therefore, the difference between dogmatism and
criticism lies only in their approach towards the absolute, not in the concept of the
absolute as such, which again emphasizes the mythologization that is required in order to
articulate the narrative of the absolute as beginning.
Schelling thus begins his analysis of the absolute by taking up Kant’s elaboration
of the subject’s relation to the thing-in-itself in the Critique of Pure Reason. Criticism
seeks the thing-in-itself not in an object but out of the freedom of the activity of the
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subject. According to Schelling, the “subject is compelled to rise (through prosyllogisms) from conditional to unconditional judgments” (Schelling Letters 166), which
means that, for criticism, there is in fact an “original absolute unity which precedes every
synthesis”; criticism, therefore, “seeks what is not conditioned, and that the very striving
which produces a synthesis demands an absolute thesis as goal of all philosophy”
(Schelling Letters 166; my emphasis). This conception of the thing-in-itself, as the
absolute synthesis without condition–that is a synthesis that ends in a thesis–leads
Schelling to conceive of the Critique of Pure Reason as a system of systems. In other
words, because the Critique begins from the point of the subject and not from some
object that can come to be known empirically, the subject must show the process by
which he or she has achieved an absolute thesis, providing a self-critical and self-aware
method of grasping the absolute. Criticism, then, is more of an interpretive method that
seeks out the absolute in the most consummate way; it “applies to both . . . the system of
criticism as well as to that of dogmatism,” since Kant’s Critique favours “no system
exclusively, but instead . . . [establishes] truly . . . a canon for all” systems, so that
criticism does not disprove dogmatism but rather “has taught dogmatism how it can
become dogmatism” in the first place (Schelling Letters 168-169). According to
Schelling, systematic philosophy dies once it is confined to repeat itself over and over
again in articulating itself in one particular system. The philosopher of criticism,
however, does not feel this, for the philosopher of criticism is
[t]he genuine philosopher [who] has never felt himself to be greater than when he
has beheld an infinity of knowledge. The whole sublimity of his science has
consisted in just this, that it would never be complete. He would become
unbearable to himself the moment he came to believe that he had completed his
system. That very moment he would cease to be creator and would be degraded
to an instrument of his own creature. How much more unbearable he would find
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the thought if somebody else should want to force such fetters on him!”
(Schelling Letters 172)

This is to say that criticism, for Schelling, is a system that must be able to explain all
systems insofar as it shows how it becomes philosophy itself out of its own creation, not
from something outside of it. The only thing that is posited for criticism is the subject in
terms of the freedom of its activity to create in a similar way to how Schelling thinks
Nature in the First Outline. Yet, because the subject, like nature, must be at once both the
productivity and product, this conception of the subject also exposes the subject to its
thinking and creating to the radical fact of the infinity of thinking itself, and not merely
an “infinity of knowledge,” which ungrounds rather than unites the subject as a figure of
philosophy.
But, what about the position of dogmatism? What is it that philosophers feel in
relation to the “creature” which they have created? The philosophy of dogmatism,
especially the passages which focus on Spinoza, supplies the other side of Schelling’s
approach to systematic philosophy. In the Letters, Schelling does not privilege criticism
over dogmatism, stating that they actually supplement each other, and “should
necessarily exist side by side” (Schelling Letters 172). Schelling’s appreciation of
criticism stems mostly from its function in inhibiting dogmatism’s unrestrained
enthusiasm (Schwärmerei) for thought (Schelling Letters 179). Spinoza occupies
Schelling’s interest precisely for this reason, not because “his concern in philosophy was
only with the analytical propositions” (Schelling Letters 174), but because philosophy for
Spinoza as a representative of “dogmatism” was nothing if not the realm of creative
reason, of the imagination, and enthusiastic speculation. Dogmatism thus thinks
absolutely, in the sense that the enthusiasm of its thought carries itself beyond its own
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bounds, beyond the counsel of society that sought to impose limitations upon what must
necessarily be unbound, unlimited, and unconditioned. However, because dogmatism
shows that it is capable of creating synthetic figures merely by fiat, because it can state
that God must be “because he is,” because “His existence and his essence [Wesen] must
be identical,” it is
[f]or that very reason every proof given by dogmatism is no proof in the proper
sense, and the proposition there is a God is the most unproved, the most
unprovable, the most groundless proposition–just as groundless as the supreme
principle of criticism, I am!” (Schelling Letters 174)
While criticism may teach dogmatism how it came to be, dogmatism shows criticism that
its absolute principle is itself just as groundless, so that criticism “can be spared the
reproach of fantastication [Schwärmerei] just as little as can dogmatism” (Schelling
Letters 186). But, whereas Kant’s prejudgment decides that no actual knowledge of the
absolute is possible, Spinoza is capable of this unbearable thought because he places
“everything in existence [as] merely a modification of the same infinite. . . . [Where]
there was no transition, no conflict, but only the demand that the finite strive to become
identical with the infinite and to merge in the infinity of the absolute object” (Schelling
Letters 178). While this ontological system may have seemed abhorrent to most of
Spinoza’s contemporaries, Schelling describes Spinoza as someone who gave himself up
to the happy “delusion” of this absolute state, for it represented the only means by which
he could put an end to the contradiction of life, eliminating from existence the struggle to
think of the subject’s external relation to the world outside of it. Spinoza spoke of this
absolute state not only “cheerfully, but even with ecstasy” (Schelling Letters 183). It is
this state of being infinitely within the absolute that Schelling will adopt for the Freedom
essay, yet in a way that does not imitate Spinoza’s “quiet abandonment” (Schelling
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Letters 157), for Schelling distinguishes himself from Spinoza by making contradiction
immanent within God as a vital and real principle of the Freedom essay.
However, while the Philosophical Letters provides insight into how Schelling will
take up dogmatism and criticism as binaries that supplement rather than exclude each
other, the tenth and final letter’s analysis of Greek tragedy puts both of these philosophies
under erasure and unravels their instrumentalization in the Freedom essay. Schelling
writes in the opening of the tenth letter “that there is an objective power which threatens
our freedom with annihilation,” and that we must “know” that we must “fight against it”
by “exerting our whole freedom, and thus to go down” (Schelling Letters 192). For
Schelling, Greek tragedy was the highest expression of the fated conflict between
necessity and freedom. According to Schelling, Greek tragedy, since it figures a “mortal,
destined by fate to become a malefactor,” shows the ultimate failure of human freedom:
the malefactor who succumbed under the power of fate was punished, this tragic
fact was the recognition of human freedom; it was the honor due to freedom.
Greek tragedy honored human freedom, letting its hero fight against the superior
power of fate. . . . As long as he is still free, he holds out against the power of
destiny. As soon as he succumbs he ceases to be free. (Schelling Letters 192-193)
The fact that the Letters ends with the knowledge that even “Greek tragedy,” as that
which philosophy holds up as the highest expression in art, “could not reconcile freedom
and failure” (Schelling Letters 193) must put the project of the Freedom essay into
question. Because Schelling does not return to thinking human freedom as a failure that
“fights against” fate, we can read the Freedom essay as simultaneously repressing and
salvaging what was written in the Philosophical Letters. If human freedom is a
fundamental failure, that the Freedom essay then awkwardly begins “with the correction
of [the] essential concepts” of pantheism and idealism before the “genuine investigation”
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into the essence of human freedom (Schelling Freedom 26), the obliqueness of the
Freedom essay’s “Introduction” points towards the text’s anxiety over its own subject
matter. Schelling, therefore, must repress the Philosophical Letters’s discovery of the
failure of freedom in order to argue against those who say “the concept of system
opposes the concept of freedom generally and in itself” in order to prove that “some kind
of system must be present, at least in the divine understanding, with which freedom
coexists” (Schelling Freedom 9). However, the writing of criticism and dogmatism is
imbued with the freedom of failure essentially, and, as a result, the fate of the Freedom
essay had always already been decided in the same way that any writing of human
freedom is always decided “outside it and above all time” (Schelling Freedom 49).
2. 3 The Pantheism Controversy
The Freedom essay, rather than beginning with a clear and systematic
investigation into the essence of human freedom, opens with a discussion of the
pantheism controversy. As a result, the introduction begins in a rather oblique way: a
detour we mean to probe further in this section. Because if we consider the Freedom
essay alongside the Philosophical Letters, the investigation’s opening section on
pantheism can be read in a way that sees Schelling returning to speculate upon
dogmatism as a creative and passionate philosophical project that is complementary to
criticism; for “it would be an error to think,” writes Schelling in the Freedom essay, “that
pantheism has been abolished and destroyed by idealism” (Schelling Freedom 22-23).
Rather pantheism, for Schelling, is not the Spinozistic pantheism that offended the
intellectual sensibilities of most German Idealists, because the word pantheism opens up
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for Schelling a space to re-configure and re-orient the philosophies of dogmatism and
criticism that he worked out in the Letters.
While Schelling’s prefatory evaluation of the pantheism controversy has been
largely ignored, and relegated to something of local and particular historical concern, I
argue that he uses the controversy over pantheism as a rhetorical space that allows him to
introduce God as the guiding figure of the Freedom essay. However, this introduction of
God, not as the God of theism but of pantheism, introduces problems into the system of
freedom because God, as the essence of freedom, is now elaborated through existence
rather than kept separate from it as a transcendental figure. As in the Philosophical
Letters, Schelling remains critical of dogmatism and Spinoza’s surrender to the absolute,
yet his enduring interest in pantheism9 also reveals it to be a necessary counterpoint to
theorize a system of freedom. For Schelling, pantheism becomes a speculative word in
the sense developed by Nancy, because through the word pantheism “thought ‘finds’ its
meaning,” its “speculative meaning” “right at the level” of the word” (Nancy Speculative
Remark 55). Schelling’s writing of the word pantheism is an attempt at re-appropriating it
from its common usage, for when Schelling wrote the Freedom essay, pantheism was still
a word that signified an “entire [viewpoint]” which could be “described all at once”
(Schelling Freedom 11). Pantheism had become forever separated from criticism,
because Friedrich Jacobi, as a result of the pantheism controversy that emerged between
him and Moses Mendelssohn in 1789, had laid out a “general attack on all forms of
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Work on Schelling’s relationship to pantheism and especially to Spinoza and Leibniz remains few and far
in between. For an account of the Pantheism controversy other than Schelling’s see Dale E. Snow’s
Schelling and the End of Idealism, Andrew Bowie’s Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: An
Introduction, as well as Dieter Henrich’s excellent Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press (2008).
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rationalism . . . [that] produced the extremely influential notion that all philosophical
systems could be classified as one of two diametrically opposed types: realistic or
idealistic” (Snow 15). As a result, pantheism had been negatively portrayed as a blind
realism and had also become more of a label than a system, which Schelling criticizes:
“[if] one has found the right label for a system, the rest falls into place for itself, and one
is spared the effort of examining what is characteristic about it more meticulously”
(Schelling Freedom 11). Pantheism had fallen victim to the dangers of philosophical
language, “namely,” to quote Nancy, “the danger of enclosing speculativity within the
univocal, within the unilaterality of a word” (Nancy Speculative Remark 69). For
pantheism, as it was commonly understood, was synonymous with fatalism; however,
Schelling writes that the fatalism attributed to pantheism is a “sense,” a feeling, or
implication that is not essentially connected with it; for another sense can be attributed to
it, one that “denotes nothing more than the doctrine of the immanence of things in God,
[to which] every rational viewpoint in some sense must be drawn” (Schelling Freedom
11). Pantheism, then, is rather a system that views the All as identical with the One or the
universe as identical with God rather than a system where God determines the fate and
being of those things contained within it.
In this way, pantheism answers one half of the question that Schelling pointed to
in the Philosophical Letters, that problem shared by dogmatism and criticism: why is
there something rather than nothing? However, what separates the Freedom essay’s
conception of pantheism from Spinoza’s is Schelling’s re-figuration of Jacobi’s opposing
philosophical systems, conceiving them as necessary binaries that are thought through the
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figure of the pantheist God by means of the narrative of theodicy. In what is one of
Schelling’s most famous lines from the Freedom essay, he writes,
Idealism, if it does not have as its basis a living realism, becomes just as empty
and abstract a system as that of Leibniz, Spinoza, or any dogmatist. The entire
new European philosophy since its beginning (with Descartes) has the common
defect that nature is not available for it and that it lacks a living ground . . . .
Idealism is the soul of philosophy; realism is the body; only both together can
constitute a living whole. (Schelling Freedom 26)
Here, Schelling conceives of a living realism as opposed to Spinoza, Leibniz, or Jacobi’s
conception of a mechanistic realism, and therefore does not equate realism with
dogmatism, but rather with criticism or nature in terms of the incessant production of
itself from out of itself. Idealism, on the other hand, turns out to be dogmatic as it
becomes an untouchable principle that makes the real “the ground and medium in which
the former [idealism] makes itself real and takes on flesh and blood” (Schelling Freedom
26). In the Freedom essay, then, it is the figure of the pantheistic God that is supposed to
unify idealism and realism into a coherent systematic philosophy. However, while
Spinoza makes use of the God of pantheism as a way to end the contradiction between
subject and object, Schelling’s pantheism is written side by side with idealism in a similar
way to the binary developed in the Philosophical Letters in order to form a contradiction
that breathes life into the system of freedom. God “is in itself as based in itself, will,
freedom” (Schelling Freedom 18), but he must also enter into existence with the real in
order to realize himself as a synthetic unity rather than as he first finds himself in that
initial contradiction that splits his identity into himself and his other, the ground of his
existence.
However, that initial contradiction cannot be unified simply by using the figure of
the pantheist God because it requires a narrative supplement, that is, the figure of
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theodicy. Theodicy is introduced as a narrative to explain the ideal’s emergence into
existence with the real, and supplements the realist half of the Freedom essay, since
theodicy is itself a narrative of God’s self-revelation that–so as to posit a beginning, a
middle and an end–focuses on the problem of evil as what motivates God towards his
unification. Rather than posit freedom in human terms as the failure of the struggle
against the absolute, Schelling places freedom in the figural covenant between God and
man as “the capacity for good and evil” (Schelling Freedom 23). In this sense, Schelling
makes God into a real, existential being that is not wholly self-same because he is the
possibility for good and evil and therefore the possibility for the narrative of theodicy.
According to Schelling, Spinoza’s pantheist God was already complete, and “serves
merely to determine the relationship of things to God but not what they [things, beings,
man] may be, considered for themselves” (Freedom 16), whereas Schelling’s pantheism
erases the fatalistic sense from the word “pantheism,” by writing the figure of the
pantheist God as a subject in the process of its own becoming. Schelling thus redirects all
of European philosophy back towards the God of pantheism and uses the figures of
pantheism and theodicy or realism and idealism as a means of writing this new system of
freedom.
However, because Schelling turns God into a real and personal figure as opposed
to a merely abstract principle, God is no longer a transcendent being and becomes a
figure within the text’s economy of writing. Because he is personal, he is opened up to
the problems of the finite world that must be worked out in order to close off the
narrative of theodicy. The development of personality as a philosophical principle marks
a turning point in Schelling’s works by investing the absolute into the singular parts of
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the absolute system, linking its survival to the existence and progress of those individual
articulations that support it. While it is true that Schelling had already expressed such a
continuity between the whole and its products in the First Outline, he formulates the
concept of personality together with the concept of pantheism and theodicy in the
Freedom essay not only as a way of tying God to nature but as a way of further
connecting God’s self-revelation to a covenant formed with man. A personal God, then,
intensifies the interrelation between the absolute and the individuals that constitute it by
exposing the more general system of pantheism to the problems God must face through
the writing of his own self-revelation within the narrative of theodicy.
But, because Schelling refuses the peaceful correlation between the absolute and
man which Spinoza had theorized, and instead inserts the conflict between good and evil
within God, man becomes that by which God’s revelation is assured or forfeited, and
Schelling therefore re-inserts the problem of human freedom as failure into the Freedom
essay. The figure of theodicy makes God dependent on man by turning man into the site
of the conflict between good and evil, thus passing on the conflict that is within God on
to man. This results in turning man into the figure by which the story is to be decided.
The conflict can only take place in man, because God cannot be associated with evil
except through his relationship to the realm of the ground and man, because what is
“inseverable in God must therefore be severable in man–and this is the possibility of
good and evil” (Schelling Freedom 33). Theodicy, therefore, functions in the same way
as criticism, as it sets up a dialectic, or one of Schelling’s favorite words, a contradiction,
for “without the contradiction of necessity and freedom,” writes Schelling, “not only
philosophy but each higher willing of the spirit would sink into the death that is proper to
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those sciences in which this contradiction has no application” (Schelling Freedom 10).
However, while theodicy furnishes the contradiction by which the system of freedom
may proceed, the pantheist God of dogmatism becomes no longer separate from this
conflict. God, in the Freedom essay, as a result of the concept of personality, now has a
personal stake in the conflict between good and evil in the ground of his existence. In
other words, by making the conflict between good and evil a real conflict that must be
resolved by man, Schelling has made the God of pantheism’s salvation dependent upon
the fulfilled idea of a theodicean history; if the narrative of theodicy is not fulfilled, this
reveals a fundamental gap in God’s own being since God is unable to authorize his own
existence without the supplement of an other such as the figure of theodicy or the figure
of man. This is to say that God’s authority is only real insofar as he imposes upon
existence the responsibility to eliminate evil from his ground. However, since the ground
is separate and distinct from God and yet contained within him as the essential realm of
revelation, God becomes subject to the freedom of man to do either good or evil, which
could mean the success or the failure of God’s revelation.
This relationship raises the question, if God is absolutely free, should God also
grant freedom to those things of creation? This anxiety was present even in the
Philosophical Letters, since it was asked: would a higher being interfere with individual
freedom or would the immanence of things in God be both a failure and a saving of
freedom? However, this is only a superficial articulation of this anxiety; underneath, the
conflict between good and evil raises the question: can God actually claim authorship
over the history which he writes for himself and of which he is a part? Can God keep his
creation within bounds and not become an instrument of his own creature? For, if we read
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against the grain, what the Freedom essay demonstrates is the illusion of the authority
gained through positing God and the ground within a theodicy. What results, to borrow
from Žižek’s work on Schelling, is not unlike
[t]he gap exemplified by the ancient Aztec priest who organizes human sacrifices
to ensure the rising of the sun, who is alarmed by the seemingly "irrational"
prospect that the most obvious thing will not happen[.] And is not the same
gesture of freely asserting the inevitable constitutive of the position of a Master?
By means of his "Yes!" a Master merely "dots the i's," attests the unavoidable–he
acts as if he has a choice where effectively there is none. (For that reason, there is
unavoidably something inherently asinine involved in the position of a Master: a
Master's main role is to state the obvious). (Žižek“Abyss of Freedom” 70)
Existence is already apparent, and what Žižek points out is the meaningless abyss that
stands behind the concept of authority. God may realize existence in the text, but
obviously existence must necessarily come to pass. The sublime power of the Word that
ushers in creation in an opening of the limitless reaches of existence turns out to be
nothing but God gesturing at what passes before him and quite possibly beyond him.
2. 4 The Evil that Lies Beneath
What makes Schelling such an interesting thinker is specifically the autodeconstructive personality of his texts, for the authority of the Freedom essay and The
Ages is undermined specifically by the figures of God and the ground that, here in the
Freedom essay, the text deploys in order to establish God’s authority over his revelation.
In the Freedom essay, in order to avoid the abyss of the past, Schelling theorizes, by
means of what he calls the law of identity and the law of the ground, a God who is able to
contain within himself the ground for his own self-manifestation. Yet, according to the
law of identity and the meaning of the copula, the identity of God is split into two
opposing and different beings: God as he Himself and God as ground of his own
existence. In this sense, saying, ‘God is ground,’ is like saying ‘the body is blue.’ To say
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that one is the other does not mean that they are the same according to Schelling’s logic,
for the statement differentiates “subject and object as what precedes and what follows
(antecedens et consequens)” (Schelling Freedom 14). From this, Schelling draws upon a
second law titled the law of the ground (Gesetz des Grundes): “Therefore, the eternal
must also be a ground immediately and as it is in itself. That of which the eternal is a
ground through its being is in this respect dependent and, from the point of view of
immanence, also something contained within the eternal” (Freedom 17; my emphasis).
And although Schelling qualifies the word ‘dependent’ so that we do not misconstrue it to
mean that something dependent is determined, we as readers are confronted with the
impossible paradox of God’s self-dependence–because independence does not
appropriately convey the split in God’s identity–on something that is at once contained
within him but “is not He Himself” (Schelling Freedom 28).
The figures of God and the ground thus bring up the question of firstness and
secondness, since the ground of God’s existence must in fact exist in a sense before God
so that God may come to be. This problem of whether God succeeds the ground or
whether it is the other way around had also been a problem for Schelling when he wrote
the System of Transcendental Idealism. There, while in the process of the development of
absolute identity, Schelling necessarily had to admit a past that preceded consciousness
and which ultimately permits its realization. In his introduction to the System, Michael
Vater argues that the past of the objective world–the unconscious that opposes the
conscious–problematizes the primacy and authority of absolute consciousness, insofar as
the objective world must in some way precede the subject. Absolute consciousness,
although it includes the unconscious in the realm of the subjective as what is intuitively
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objective, always encounters something that resists consciousness as a fact that precedes
and is always beyond the powers of the conscious understanding. Although the
unconscious in the System does not assume the same kind of psychological affect that
comes up in the Freedom essay and the 1815 version of The Ages of the World, the past
does always appear to complicate any understanding of temporality, firstness and
secondness, and hence complicates the place of authority in each text in which it is
articulated.
It is this traumatic affect of the past that leads to the concept of the ground, not as
something that can be subsumed under the authority of God, but in terms of an
ungrounded figure that deconstructs God from within. Schelling writes that the ground
“is nature–in God, a being indeed inseparable, yet still distinct from him” (Schelling
Freedom 27) that does in fact “[precede] him in existence” (Schelling Freedom 28).
Another distinguishing factor that separates Schelling’s pantheism from Spinoza’s is
Spinoza’s “mechanistic view of nature” (Schelling Freedom 20). Drawing largely from
the First Outline, Schelling attributes to the ground the “dynamic notion of nature”
(Schelling Freedom 20), and therefore places within it the dynamism and productivity
that escapes the bounds imposed by God’s authority, making the ground as nature a
deconstructive rather than constructive figure.
Such an identity of the product and the productivity in the original conception of
Nature is expressed by the ordinary view of Nature as a whole, which is at once
the cause and effect of itself, and is in its duplicity (which runs through all
phenomena) again identical. (First Outline 202)
But here Schelling inverts and suppresses the primacy of the ground in favor of the
primacy of God “in so far as the ground, even as such, could not exist if God did not exist
actu” (Schelling Freedom 28). The difference, then, between nature in the First Outline
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compared to the Freedom essay is clearly expressed in the way Schelling figures nature
as dependent on something outside of it, namely God; for in the 1809 Freedom essay, the
authority of God limits nature:
The first effect of the understanding in nature is the division of forces, since only
thus can understanding unfold the unity that is unconsciously but necessarily
immanent in nature as in a seed, just as in man the light enters into the dark
yearning to create something so that in the chaotic jumble of thoughts, all hanging
together, but each hindering the other from emerging, thoughts divide themselves
from each other, and now the unity hidden in the ground and containing all raises
itself up . . . . Because, namely, this being (of primordial nature) is nothing else
than the eternal ground for the existence of God. (Schelling Freedom 30)
In the Freedom essay, Schelling tries to write nature in relation to God as merely the
“yearning the eternal One feels to give birth to itself” (Schelling Freedom 28); however
because nature is divested of the unconditioned and absolute force attributed to it in the
First Outline, this articulation of nature as merely a yearning rather than as a site of its
own productivity must be put under erasure. Nature’s sudden abandonment to the
authority of God seems out of place, and is rather a means to answer a question that is
carried over from the First Outline: how does nature inhibit its absolute productivity?
David Farrell Krell notes that this problem plagued not only Schelling but the entire
generation of philosophers after Kant; “[t]he bedeviling problem for Schelling… is how
infinite activity could ever have submitted to such compulsion to reproduction or to a
condition or determination of any kind–above all, the compulsion of inhibition
(Hemmung)” (Krell Tragic Absolute 48).
But, while to Krell nature’s inhibition in the First Outline appears arbitrary,
Schelling accounts for nature’s inhibition in the Freedom essay by subordinating it to the
primacy of God, turning nature into the voice of God’s “effeminate lamentations”
(Schelling Freedom 29). And yet this insoluble problem of inhibition takes on staggering
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new dimensions in the Freedom essay, for while gender was not really at issue in the
philosophy of nature, nature in the Freedom essay is defined clearly as the feminine half
of God that must suffer under a male authority. Schelling refers to God as ‘himself’ and
as both ‘father’ and ‘son,’ but it is only by means of a male dominion over the dark,
feminine ground that God can write his own revelation. Schelling inverts and suppresses
the primacy of the ground in exchange for the primacy of God, and therefore makes the
feminine into that which cannot exist without its masculine authority. But, if darkness is
the bearer of light, and “[a]ll birth is birth from darkness into light” (Schelling Freedom
29), how is it that nature is subordinate to God? Is it because, as Krell notes, philosophy
“is here made to suffer emasculation” (Krell Tragic Absolute 76)? There is an uncanny
interdependence that connects God to the ground in the Freedom essay because it is not
as if God can simply extricate itself from and transcend above the ground; without it, as
was made clear above, idealism cannot become the true philosophy since it needs its
living ground. But the subordination of the feminine to the masculine is a false relation
imposed upon nature by the narrative of theodicy. For if the ground is separate and if
“[man] is formed in the maternal body” (Schelling Freedom 29), then the feminine body
also becomes representative of a dissent and an anxiety for the male figure of God, as
Krell has pointed out,
When idealism fails to take on flesh and blood in the womb of realism, its high
spirits and presumed high-mindedness culminate in a Selbstzerfleischung [selfmutilation or self-destruction] that the idealist wanted to rule out in the first
place–as though there were already in idealism, quite in spite of its conception of
itself, a Fleisch susceptible to mutilation. (Krell Tragic Absolute 77)
The ground, then, is made into God’s ‘foot-stool’ “because God perceived the will of the
ground as the will for his revelation and . . . recognized that a ground independent from
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him (as spirit) would have to be the ground for his existence” (Schelling Freedom 45).
But, this is in fact not a benevolent relation, for when God enters into relation with the
ground of his existence, to borrow from Lord Byron’s Cain, God “Sit[s] on his vast and
solitary throne–/ Creating worlds, to make eternity/ Less burdensome to his immense
existence/ And unparticipated solitude” (Byron 1. 1. 148-151). This is the dark reality
that taints the love that God holds towards his own creation, and is the madness behind
the self’s splitting itself in two in order to grasp its own self-sameness that is in reality
not there.
Indeed, insofar as Schelling writes the ground in order to serve the figure of
theodicy as the possibility for the revelation of God, this same writing is complicated in
its instrumentalization of the ground for the egotistical purposes of God’s self-revelation.
Because Schelling assigns the ground its own particular freedom that resists the
‘benevolent guidance’ of eternal freedom, the ground is a deconstructive figure rather
than subordinate figure within the regulative and linear narrative of theodicy and
revelation. The eternal will of the ground differs from the eternal will of God in its ability
to change course and to realize and reveal itself according to its own will by actively and
naturally resisting God’s will. Just as God becomes the eternal principle of freedom by
means of the law of identity and the law of the ground, so too does the ground’s
particular freedom. Interestingly, the original purpose of these two laws was to keep God
separate from the ground and yet also to incorporate it into God as the means by which
God writes out the history of his own revelation. Yet the writing of theodicy, which
presents God as the authority by which the text smoothly progresses, is not able to
contain its dis-ease with what erupts in the metaphorical language of the ground.
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Theodicy represents, therefore, an instance of the text’s attempt at repressing the autoimmunity of its writing. In other words, the benevolence of God is an anxious articulation
that tries to repress the willful anarchy of the ground of God’s existence; what was
supposed to legitimate the authority of God as the writer of history ends up putting the
concept of authority under erasure, which shows the arbitrariness of authority as merely
an articulation rather than a grounded principle to which God has recourse. In a passage
that is primarily meant to buttress Schelling’s law of the ground, Schelling furthermore
uses a lurid figure, that of the eye, which deconstructs the desired authority that the law
of the ground is meant to re-inscribe.
An individual body part, like the eye is only possible within the whole of an
organism; nonetheless, it has its own life for itself, indeed, its own kind of
freedom, which it obviously proves through the disease of which it is capable.
Were that which is contained in another not itself alive, then there would be
containment without some thing being contained, that is, nothing would be
contained…. God is not a god of the dead but of the living. (Schelling Freedom
18)
In this sense, the ground, as that which is contained within the concept of God, is
absolutely alive in two ways: firstly for God, and secondly for itself. Thus, on the one
hand, the ground is already subjugated under God’s eternal will and cannot decide how to
actualize its freedom, while, on the other, it is capable of resisting its instrumentalization
by virtue of falling sick. The metaphors of life and organicism perform the same kind of
resistance that the eye performs in relation to the body which is representative of the
particular will’s resistance, its fight, against the universal will that seeks to exploit it in
order to write the history of theodicy.
In the section on the deduction of the possibility of evil, Schelling writes the
triumph of good as the figure of light in order to subordinate and repress evil as the figure
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of darkness, but this in fact also opens up new possibilities of dissent within the ground.
The evil principle is figured as the self-will of the ground that is obsessed with its own
particular selfhood. Opposed to the ground’s pure egoity is the figure of good or of light,
that is, the universal will of the understanding. The only possible way these opposing
figures can come into existence is through man as articulated within an eschatological
and typological rhetoric that figures man as the means by which theodicy can be written
out and completed. It is in man that the conflict of good and evil meet in their most real
opposition and will eventually, according to Schelling, transform into what is called the
principle of spirit. Yet, because this principle emerges out of the opposition between light
and dark that are themselves figures within the theodicean narrative, so too is spirit itself
a figure through which the text can write the narrative of theodicy.
Spirit, therefore, is deployed in order to bring about the final unity of “light and
darkness (vowel and consonant)” (Schelling Freedom 32). However, this final unity, or
what Schelling calls ‘consonance,’ is always a becoming spirit, for “[s]elfhood as such is
spirit”; but because “man is spirit as a selfish [selbstsich], particular being (separated
from God),” the spirit of man can potentially become a figure of dissonance as well as
consonance (Schelling Freedom 33). The gap that separates the particular human from
God does not negate a particular personality that is itself different from God, because,
according to the logic of the eschatology, this particular personality is a becoming spirit;
in other words, the particular spirits are what make up God’s self-revelation into the
unified principle of spirit. Spirit is thus figured as “raised from the creaturely into what is
above the creaturely” and what is “rather above and outside of all nature” (Schelling
Freedom 33). But, as is the case with the eye that falls sick, the selfish figure of the
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ground does not necessarily need to follow the guidance and understanding of the figure
of light; indeed, selfhood can choose its own vectors of possibility “if it is in fact not the
spirit of eternal love–selfhood can separate itself from the light; or self-will can strive to
be as a particular will that which it only is, in so far as it remains in the centrum” of the
ground (Schelling Freedom 33). The personality of the particular self-will, then, is
capable of dissent and dissolution, and can potentially overturn the direction and
magnitude of the particular in relation to the universal.
The narrative of theodicy is therefore opposed to the marginalized narrative of the
ground, a narrative characterized by a persistence of “an indignant host of desires and
appetites” as well as a “life… which, though individual, is, however, false, a life of
mendacity, a growth of restlessness and decay”; however, the life of the ground actually
becomes a speculative and experimental articulation within the regulative and linear
narrative of the text’s theodicy, insofar as the ground’s “most fitting comparison here is
offered by disease which, as the disorder having arisen in nature through the misuse of
freedom, is the true counterpart of evil or sin” (Schelling Freedom 34). But because
disease itself is a freedom that allows for the individual part ‘such as the eye’ to be
independent of the body and therefore to be for itself, the life of the ground as a disease,
decay, and restlessness becomes a being within God that asserts a particular freedom in
opposition to the freedom of God. In this sense, as William Blake said of John Milton,
Schelling has perhaps unknowingly become part ‘of the devil’s party,’ for, as Schelling
writes of the devil, “according to the Christian point of view, [the devil] was not the most
limited creature, but rather the least limited one” (Schelling Freedom 36). In this sense,
the metaphorical language used to describe evil, disease, and the life of the ground
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figures them as potentially too unruly for the language of theodicy, since the
metaphorical inscription of theodicy within the text presents an unlimited and an
unbounded life that is not God's. Instead, these metaphors open a speculative reading of
evil as a voice of dissent against God’s arbitrary authority; evil is a subtext, or a
marginalized point of view, that was unjustly exploited in order to run the economy of
theodicy. Consequently, theodicy appears as a deceptive narration that cannot integrate or
express God’s relationship with its ground except in the language of a conflict. Instead of
instilling faith in the figure of God as a redemptive transcendental signifier, the figuration
of the ground must put the authority of God under erasure, begging more questions than it
answers.
The concept of ground, therefore, paradoxically becomes fundamental to
establishing the existence of God, but, at the same time, has the undeniable potential to
unground and unravel God’s authorial position. As Schelling writes,
This concept arises from the relation of the whole to the individual, from unity to
multiplicity, or however one wants to express it. The positive is always the whole
or unity; that which opposes unity is severing of the whole, disharmony, ataxia of
forces. The same elements are in the severed whole that were in the cohesive
whole; that which is material in both is the same (from this perspective, evil is not
more limited or worse than the good), but the formal aspect of the two is totally
different, though this formal aspect still comes precisely from the essence or the
positive itself. (Schelling Freedom 38)
What is most unsettling about God’s relationship to its ground is not simply that the
ground deconstructs God’s authority, but that the elements which are in the whole that is
disrupted are the same as those in the whole that tries to maintain the semblance of
cohesion. What distinguishes the two is their formal aspect, that is, how both take from
the same source but distort the source into different forms, alienating God from his own
manifestations, and showing exactly what it was that scared Spinoza so much about the
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objective world that opposed and disfigured the integrity of the figure of God. In this
sense, God actually provides the means of its own deconstruction. Is it not this absurd
notion of God’s own construction/deconstruction that Schelling seems to imply by the
concept of the indivisible remainder, “the incomprehensible base of reality in things…
that which with the greatest exertion cannot be resolved in understanding but rather
remains eternally in the ground” (Schelling Freedom 29)? For God cannot come into
existence without the ground coming into existence equally for itself, as “[g]ood without
active selfhood is inactive good…. Only selfhood that has been overcome, thus brought
back from activity to potentiality, is the good” (Schelling Freedom 63). On the other
hand, since “in God there is an independent ground of reality and, hence, two equally
eternal beginnings of self-revelation” (Schelling Freedom 59), it becomes not so much a
matter of good overcoming selfhood, since revelation “must be considered in regard to
his [God’s] freedom in relation to both [good and evil]” (Schelling ibid.). God is not
selfsame but is split in the same way the text is actually writing out two eternally
different narratives, the narrative of the ground, which is “the yearning of the One to give
birth to itself,” but also the figure of the deconstruction of God’s benevolence and
arbitrary authority and existence; the second narrative is the narrative of theodicy, of
God, as the will of understanding, “whereby the word is spoken out into nature and
through which God first makes himself personal” (Schelling ibid.).
To read the Freedom essay against the grain is to disclose the text as already at
work consuming and entangling its principles from the beginning. Although the
irreducible remainder is what runs underneath existence as the roiling darkness that
thrives on its forsaken condition, it is equally what gives birth to light, and indeed, the
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claim that the ground submits to God’s authority appears untenable and must be put
under erasure. For the ground does not appear to submit to God but rather God submits to
the ground, therefore becoming an instrument of his own creature. Theodicy, thus, is used
to repress the deconstructive potential of the Freedom essay through the writing and
rhetoric it uses to ascribe a beginning, middle, and end to a text that is fundamentally
obsessed with explaining how temporality ever comes to be in the first place. The
repression, however, is a secondary repression, insofar as it is a conscious and specific
psychical act that tries to occlude something from the text’s narrative, and yet remains
ultimately unsuccessful. By using revelation and theodicy as metaphors for time, in the
words of Carol Jacobs, to “[generate] out of a series of repetitions… the illusion of
sequence or linear temporal order” (Jacobs 107), Schelling tries to use God’s history in
order to achieve the notion of a fully actualized God and hence a completely realized
system of freedom. Consequently, Schelling falls victim to his own precautions,
prioritizing univocality above the plurality of speculative language. Yet, while the text
may avoid the “quiet abandonment” of Spinoza’s surrender to the absolute, the Freedom
essay discloses a God whose whole body is not selfsame and is always anxious about its
own bodily (de)composition and (dys)functionality by trying to repress the productive
and creative ground of its existence. What Schelling’s writing of theodicy as the history
of God shows is not a composite, linear, or unified God but rather a figure that is subject
to a history that splits apart, which opens up an abyssal gap that separates the ideal from
its real other, and puts in to question the continuity which Schelling had initially pleaded
for in the preface to the Freedom essay. Therefore, regardless of the figures that Schelling
resorts to–be it God, pantheism, or theodicy–in order to legitimate and seal this continuity
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and linear development of freedom away from the possibility of its own deconstruction, a
system of freedom is always subject to the auto-immunity of its writing, to its own
ungroundedness, and to its failure.
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The Disfigured God

3. 1 Introduction
This third chapter begins our analysis of Schelling’s unpublished magnum opus,
The Ages of the World. While this chapter will focus on Schelling’s relationship to Jacob
Boehme and how this lends itself to a reading of the Ages as a writing of Gnosticism (i.e.
as the writing of knowledge as esotericism), the fourth and final chapter will continue this
investigation into the 1815 version of The Ages of The World with a deconstructive
reading of the Godhead as the figure which brings about the traumatic writing of the text,
a site that represents the necessary relationship between writing and repression. For now,
this chapter’s focus on Schelling’s relationship to Boehme, as a representative of the
diversity and heretical nature of Gnostic writing and not as a visionary mystic of
monotheism, serves as a lens to read Schelling’s text as a writing of madness as well as a
writing of knowledge. As the introduction to each version of the Ages opens with a
conception of temporality as representable and knowable, wherein the “past is known, the
present is discerned, the future is intimated” (Schelling Ages xxxv), this knowledge
signals to us, as readers, that the project of the Ages can be read as a mythopoeic writing
of God’s self-revelation towards the achievement of absolute knowledge. I argue that the
Ages, in its projected narrative of God in the three ages of past, present, and future, takes
part in “[one] of the chief characteristics of Gnosticism . . . [that is,] in the construction of
elaborate myths through which revealed gnosis is transmitted” (Pearson 14); but because
this mythopoeic writing can never overcome the writing of the book of the past, the Ages
puts the activity of mythologization under erasure.
If we turn to the writings of Jacob Boehme, it becomes evident that Schelling
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metaleptically transposes Boehme’s Gnostic writing and theosophical figures into the
realm of idealist philosophy. The writings of Boehme, despite their theological devotion,
represent a “hinge,” a term borrowed from Derrida in Resistances of Psychoanalysis10,
through which Schelling can work through the problems of German Idealism and
Romanticism, taking up Gnosticism as a way to think more dangerously and write more
experimentally. In this sense, Boehme’s gnostic writings represent a site of intellectual
ferment, or a heresy in the true sense of the word as the “choice” to oppose authority, a
heresy that challenges orthodox Christian writings as representative of the order of
established reason. By reading Boehme along with the writings of Georges Bataille, I
also argue that Gnostic writing or the writing of knowledge tries to impose a “silence,” in
the words of Derrida, upon the writing of madness; Gnostic writing writes itself in order
to evade the problems of darkness and evil. The writing of knowledge, to quote from
Derrida, as a “discourse of command . . . insists upon being sheltered, and . . . also insists
upon providing itself with protective barriers against madness” (Derrida “Cogito” 38).
However, in order to write the history of knowledge, Gnosticism, as will be shown, must
also write its discordant counterpoint. While the Freedom essay represents a first instance
of Schelling’s writing of Gnosticism insofar as it also puts up barriers to write a more
linear and composed progression towards knowledge, the Ages disfigures this writing as
it deconstructs the narrative’s progress towards gnosis through its simultaneous writing of
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
10	
  “Why a charnière? This word can be taken in the technical or anatomical sense of a central or cardinal
articulation, a hinge pin (cardo) or pivot. A charnière or hinge is an axial device that enables the circuit, the
trope, or the movement, of rotation. ... This double articulation, this double movement or alternation
between opening and closing that is assured by the workings of a hinge, this coming and going, indeed
this fort/da of a pendulum (pendule) or balance (balancier) – that is what Freud means to Foucault. ... There
will always be this interminable, alternating movement that successively opens and closes, draws near and
distances, rejects and accepts, excludes and includes, disqualifies and legitimates, masters and liberates. ...
Freud as the doorman of the today, the holder of the keys, of those that open as well as those that close the
door, ... stands guard and ushers in. Alternatively or simultaneously, he closes one epoch and opens
another" (Derrida Resistances 78-9).
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the history of madness. Gnosticism, then, cannot silence its other; rather Boehme’s and
Schelling’s texts open up a way of reading Gnosticism not as a blind and naïve activity
that surrenders to God’s omniscience and omnipotence, but as an unresolved and infinite
writing of knowledge that fundamentally cannot be written without its heretical Other:
the writing of madness.
Yet while Schelling’s writing of Gnosticism does adopt figures and narratives
from Boehme’s texts, his texts are distinct insofar as he pathologizes the history of
knowledge by also writing out the history of madness as knowledge’s complementary
antithesis. Since “nothing great can be accomplished,” writes Schelling in the 1815
version of the Ages, “without a constant solicitation of madness, which should always be
overcome, but should never be utterly lacking” (Schelling Ages 103), this writing
presents a radical reinterpretation of Gnosticism’s deployment of the opposition between
reason and madness. The traditional Gnostic opposition is “expressed in terms of a tragic
split in the divine world that results in the genesis of the lower beings responsible for the
cosmos” (Pearson 13), which arises, in the words of David Brakke, from the “downward
movement of the divine” (often called Wisdom) into the realm of fate” in order “to
recover [God’s] lost divine energy” (Brakke 20). This downward movement of the divine
into materiality, this split between a higher and a lower realm of existence, also provides
Gnosticism with a rationale for God’s entrance into history, turning it into the means by
which God and man can resolve this tragic split. The main difference between Boehme
and Schelling, then, is that Boehme successfully represses–insofar as it is successful in
name only–God’s dark ground and the anarchy of evil contained within it in order to
fulfill a theological history, making Boehme much more traditionally Gnostic than
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Schelling. It is worth noting that Boehme’s opposition between reason and madness,
good and evil, the will of God and the craving of his dark non-ground represents a crude
model of dialectical thought, insofar as it prefigures the way Schelling makes use of
contradiction, using it as fundamental principle that supplies the vital animation of his
systematic philosophy and thought in general. However, Schelling’s writing of madness
does not rely upon Boehme’s dialectical articulation between reason and madness in the
same way. Rather, it shows that madness is not something that can be so easily overcome,
as the order of madness not only resists but contains within it the potential to absolutely
disrupt the order of knowledge that the Ages tries to write.
3. 2 Gnosticism and the Choice of Heretical Writing
Although Boehme’s Gnosticism is more traditional, if we read his writing against
the grain, his texts all write of a figure of the dark non-ground, which will be taken up by
Schelling, first in the Freedom essay and then in the Ages, as the ungrounded figure of
the first nature. Gnosticism, in the potential and dormant expression of its discordant
ground, thus appears as a profoundly radical activity, insofar as its writing is always
potentially dangerous to its own integrity as well as to orthodox Christian writing as an
authoritative or dogmatic system of belief. In other words, Gnosticism takes on the
position of the order of madness which opposes the authority of orthodox Christianity’s
order of knowledge. Indeed, Gnosticism has for a long time been considered a deranged
or “parasitic discourse” (O’Regan 18) that “[turns] Christianity on its head,” as Brakke
writes, not because of its apostasy but because of its radical faith in a privileged insight
into the nature of God; “they [the Gnostics],” Brakke continues, “thought they were
teaching true Christianity, and they severely criticized other Christians as hopelessly
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deceived” (Brakke 2). Gnosticism, as a heretical writing of the divine, provides an
internal unworking of orthodox writing as it is at once enthusiastic and critical, in the
words of Schelling, since its approach towards the absolute shows how it can deconstruct
from within dogmatism’s quiet surrender to God. In this way, Gnosticism is the
concealed, hidden writing that lies subjacent under the writing of orthodox Christianity,
whose belief in salvation is put under erasure by the heretical history that sees the divine
not as something complete in itself, but as something in the process of its own becoming,
and something that constantly works towards unifying the contradiction brought forth
from the creation of his dual existence.
But before we turn to Boehme’s writing, Boehme the man provides us with plenty
of evidence of Gnosticism as a disruptive and intellectually varied practice that stands in
opposition to the singular and unified discourse of orthodox Christianity. Until the middle
of the twentieth century, Jacob Boehme (also written as Jakob Böhme or Jakob Behmen)
had been read as a visionary mystic whose writings were directly the result of a miracle
of illumination that occurred in 1600, which, according to his biographers, supposedly
granted Boehme a prophetic insight. The way that Boehme’s writings were characterized
according to a privileged insight into the nature of God rather than in terms of the range
of his reading had a significant effect on the readings of Boehme up until the 20th
century; according to Robert F. Brown, whose book The Later Philosophy of Schelling
investigates the relationship between Boehme and Schelling, “no genuinely critical
biography was published until 1924” (Brown 33), and thus his visionary power was either
vehemently defended by his biographers or was left unquestioned. More recently,
dispelling the myth surrounding Boehme’s moment of illumination, Andrew Weeks
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writes
Boehme’s illumination, though surely a singularly transforming and inspiring
experience, should not be thought of as fundamentally distinct from other
processes of inspiration. The notion that his writings were records of ecstatic
visions not only contributes almost nothing to their interpretation, it is detrimental
to our understanding of the writer in the cultural context of his times. (Weeks 30)
Along with Robert F. Brown, works by Andrew Weeks and Cyril O’Regan have all tried
to rehabilitate Boehme by critically reading him as a writer who was a representative of
the intellectual environment of pansophism–a pedagogical and educational movement
that promoted the achievement of a universal wisdom of man and the world–during the
seventeenth-century, rather than as a singular figure whose writings magically appeared
out of the vacuum of divine inspiration. However, Boehme’s pansophism is different
insofar as his pansophistic wisdom is rather an omniscience stemming from an
enveloping knowledge of nature and Scripture. O’Regan writes: “Pansophism suggests
more than an inclusive aggregate of particulars. . . . For Boehme, the systematic character
of reality is guaranteed by a narrative suggested by Scripture, but completed only in a
pneumatic or sophiological state that transcends Scripture” (O’Regan 107). Therefore,
those readings which emphasize the illuminative aspect of Boehme’s biographical life
and its influence on his writings have also had repercussions on the way that Boehme
may be read as a precursor to figures in German Idealism such as Schelling. This
simplified representation of Boehme belies the diversity and interdisciplinarity of his
thought, which also conceals the more gnostic and pansophistic tendencies that appear in
his writing. In this way, Boehme, like Schelling, in fact read widely in a variety of
different fields, combining them, like his contemporaries, in order to achieve a pansophic
vision of the world.
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Boehme was indeed representative of a much more daring intellectual age, to

quote from Andrew Weeks, since “[around] 1600, the search for synthesis was [also]
pursued above all by the loose convention of pansophic researchers at the court of
Rudolph II in Prague” (Weeks 49). In a certain way, this convention represented an early
attempt at interdisciplinary studies, drawing on “men of various disciplines, of differing
confessions and nationalities,” all in the pursuit “of construing the orders of the world”
(Weeks 49). Weeks continues, “[t]hey did so by researching nature and Scripture. Their
efforts encompassed religion, science, law, and the arts” (Weeks 49). It appears that
previous readings of Boehme, which generally saw him alongside his forerunner
Paracelsus, did not consider other attempts at pansophism which were taking place at that
time such as those undertaken by Giordano Bruno in Prague, Robert Fludd, Galileo, and
the astronomer Johannes Kepler, which indicate that all of these thinkers “were in reality
part of a broader current, with more distant sources” than earlier biographers recognized
(Weeks 49). Weeks states that there are clear indications that Boehme’s writings adapt or
make use of a number of different influences besides those of Paracelsus, including
references to Platonic Ideas, Hermetic magic, as well as evidence of the “Renaissance
syncretism of Ficino and Pico [that] also blended elements of Jewish Kabbalah with
Christian currents of speculation” (Weeks 49). The blindness of Boehme’s earlier
biographers had led readers to believe that he was uneducated in these matters, and
attributed to him a more orthodox writing which fails to grasp the diversity of Gnostic
writing; but, Robert F. Brown states, “[a]lthough lacking the classical and formal training
of a professional philosopher, he [Boehme] nevertheless read widely in the alchemical,
mystical, and religious literature of his day” (Brown 33-34). Contrary to previous
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readings, Boehme in fact “came to embrace the belief that ancient knowledge was
resurfacing,” and, therefore, blended ancient with modern conceptions of the universe “in
order to reinforce and clarify the Christian articles of faith” (Weeks 50). It is thus that
Boehme, according to Andrew Weeks, was led to ask questions that were not
traditionally theological, but, in the words of Cyril O’Regan, metaleptically transformed
numerous areas of thought and disciplines in order to express his thoughts in opposition
to traditional theology on what exactly was the unfathomable “locus of the world.” For
[t]he doctrinal either/or was the shibboleth of partisan divisiveness and bitter
polarization. But what if the sun were not in an upper heaven, but rather at the
very center of the created world? What if the solar or stellar forces were
themselves both material and divine? And what if the dualism which knew no
middle ground between matter and spirit (between the element or body, and the
spirit, sign, meaning, or thought) rested on a false dichotomy, false because
external nature and human nature were in either case triadically structured as
aspects of the ubiquitous Triune God? (Weeks 50-51)
All of the above questions position Boehme thus as representative of “a privileged
site of the return of a Gnostic modality of thought in modernity” (O’Regan 2).
Gnosticism, in the way that we are reading it, comes from the Greek adjective gnostikos,
which applies “to capacities, intellectual activities, or mental operations” wherein a
“gnostic activity or capacity was one that led to or supplied gnosis, that is knowledge that
was not merely practical but theoretical, immediate, and intuitive” (Brakke 30). As an
activity that was equally dependent on its writing, Gnosticism was criticized early on by
Irenaeus of Lyons in 160 CE as being “extremely diverse and yet somehow all the same”
(Brakke 29). Irenaeus’s criticism, as a defense coming from an orthodox Christian
perspective, ironically shows the lack of diversity and rigidity of orthodox Christianity,
and, in a sense, puts its authority under erasure; when held up to the wildly speculative
potential of Gnosticism as a writing that continuously questions its own history, the
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orthodox narrative of Christianity becomes disfigured by Gnosticism’s re-figuration of
itself through not one but multiply divergent narratives. It is this metaleptical quality, a
term borrowed from Cyril O’Regan, of Gnosticism as a “phenomenon of a complex
disfiguration-refiguration of biblical narrative” (O’Regan 17) that makes Boehme’s work
a hinge that allows one to think and unthink the concept of God, not merely in traditional
theology, but also for philosophy. Gnosticism, as a writing, can never become an
orthodoxy for it eternally writes itself as the Other of orthodox Christianity; it always
threatens traditional theology due to its belief in, to quote Georges Bataille,
matter as an active principle having its own eternal autonomous existence as
darkness (which would not be simply the absence of light, but the monstrous
archontes revealed by this absence), and as evil (which would not be the absence
of good, but a creative action). This conception was perfectly incompatible with
the very principle of the profoundly Hellenistic spirit, whose dominant tendency
saw matter and evil as degradations of superior principles. Attributing the creation
of the earth, where our repugnant and derisory agitation takes place, to a horrible
and perfectly illegitimate principle evidently implies, from the point of view of
the Greek intellectual construction, a nauseating, inadmissible pessimism, the
exact opposite of what had to be established at all costs and made universally
manifest. In fact the opposed existence of an excellent divinity, worthy of the
absolute confidence of the human spirit, matters little if the baneful and odious
divinity of this dualism is under no circumstances reducible to it, without any
possibility of hope. (Bataille “Base Materialism and Gnosticism” 47)
Yet, insofar as Boehme shares traditional theology’s anxiety over the unruliness of the
figures of darkness and evil that are introduced into his system, he remains committed to
a theological writing that does not fully disfigure the God which he writes. However, it is
by means of Boehme’s instrumentalization of the figures of darkness and evil in the
service of the unquestionable authority of the good and God that his writing opens up for
us a reading that shows that they are in fact capable of questioning that authority, “since,”
to quote Bataille, “it does not appear that [the non-ground] has deeply desired the
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submission of things that belong to a higher authority, to an authority the archontes [of
discordant existence] stun with an eternal bestiality” (Bataille 48-49).
3. 3 Discordance and the Disfigured God
Therefore, let us turn to the way that Boehme writes out his metaleptical
refiguration of God in the Mysterium Pansophicum Or Thorough Report on the Earthly
and Heavenly Mysterium (1620). Like Schelling after him, Boehme writes of two beings–
God and nature–that take residence “in one united, eternal, and unfathomable original
condition” (Boehme Mysterium 88). Nature, before it enters into relation with God, is the
“non-ground” which “is an eternal nothing but forms an eternal beginning as a craving”
(Boehme Mysterium 85). Nature, as a craving and a nothing, cannot produce anything
from out of itself. Therefore, Boehme opposes to nature the will, since the nothingness of
nature “makes the will into something for itself” (Boehme Mysterium 85), and in return,
the “will rules over the craving” (Boehme Mysterium 86). As it is for Schelling, the
ground of craving, in spite of its possession of a “life” as well as its ability to incite “an
arousal of attraction or desire” (Boehme Mysterium 86), is written as something
insubstantial and dying; without the spirit of the will, without God, the non-ground is
merely a nothing that “has also has no place where it could find rest” (Boehme
Mysterium 85). This negative characterization of the non-ground is what opens up the
space for Boehme to inscribe knowledge into the essence of God, writing “the spirit of
the will is an eternal knowledge of the non-ground, and the life of the craving an eternal
being of the will” (Boehme Mysterium 87). Nature’s subservient life, then, pathetically
exists in order to inspire the desire of the spirit to take on its identity. This erotic
relationship between nature and spirit is what initiates the search for God’s
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understanding, setting in motion, in a figure that Schelling will later adopt from Boehme,
the dialectical movement metaphorically described as “a round sphere-wheel that moves
on all sides as the wheel in Ezekiel indicates” (Boehme Mysterium 89).
Yet it is not until spirit and nature enter into their separate lives, the life of nature
“toward the fire” and that of spirit “toward the light of gloria and magnificence”
(Boehme Mysterium 89), that Boehme’s writing starts to set up barriers to protect spirit
from nature, which, at the same time, forecloses the cruelty of–in an almost Artaudian
sense–Gnostic writing in its exploitation of the ground’s life. For instance, Boehme
writes that the craving nature “finds that it [itself] is not part of its [own] life,” and, as a
result, turns in upon itself in revulsion towards its alienated and divided self. In this
sense, nature is that which must undergo a life of self-revulsion so that the life of the
spirit can evade the turba (disruption or discordance) of the life of nature and those
beings and creatures within it. Yet, if the turba is also the fertile “imagination of the
eternal nature,” it is also what allows nature to give birth to the “creation of the world,”
making it a productive process despite its violent mode of being. Boehme’s writing
protects spirit and knowledge from the cruelty of existence, since “violence was not
called for,” writes Boehme, “or ordered by the highest good” (Boehme Mysterium 91).
However, spirit cannot completely wash its hands of being’s bloody “monarchia” or
“empire.” God must stand witness to the discordance of nature’s life because he was “the
first revealer,” and, although he “did not command malice into the regime” (Boehme
Mysterium 92), he is still as such to blame for setting this violent wheel in motion. God is
not exempt from this horror for he is also in the ground, as Boehme writes,
the essence of the Deity is everywhere in the deep of the unground, like as a
wheel or an eye, where the beginning has always the end…. For it is an eye in
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itself, as Ezekiel the prophet saw this in a figure at the introduction of the spirit of
his will into God, when his spiritual figure was introduced into the wisdom of
God by the Spirit of God, where he attained vision. (Sex Puncta Theosophica qd.
in O’Regan 106)
Boehme’s writing of the “evil, poisonous, and furious mysterium” of nature

represents nature as hermetically sealed off from spirit, concealing God’s ruthless
exploitation of the turba so that God may see himself as distinct from the fiery image of
nature. Boehme’s writing refuses to allow the darkness to simply be dark and
subordinates desire to understanding, darkness to light, evil to good, because evil is said
to loathe its existence,“desir[ing] a purity” (Boehme Mysterium 91) outside the life of the
turba.
God’s subordination of nature takes on new and more deranged dimensions as
Boehme writes that the non-ground of God is actually the mother of will–something
Schelling will also adopt in the Freedom essay and the Ages–“for the will finds its mother
as its craving”; and yet Boehme also writes that “the will is the master in the mother, and
the mother is recognized as silent and the will as a life without origin” (Boehme
Mysterium 86). How is it that the will can be a master of its mother if the mother is what
gives birth to the will? Regardless of the impossibility of this genealogical reversal, the
will abuses the privilege of its purity by eternally subordinating nature, its mother, so as
to bring about the fulfillment of its essence, demonstrating the violence that arises from
the will’s arbitrary rule. God is an omnipresence whose sight is not limited to before or
after its birth, whose power to be pregnant with itself and the vision of itself illustrates
the anxiety Boehme’s writing experiences as a result of the darkness it writes into its
whole. In the same way that God divests the non-ground of its creative capacity by
subordinating it to himself, Boehme’s Gnostic writing, in its repression of the dark
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origins of imagination and creation, also fears the diversity and multiplicity it introduces
through its own creative and heretical figure of the non-ground, fearing itself for the same
reasons as its orthodox critics. Boehme’s writing reveals that it is itself split, inscribing
into each text orthodox writing’s repression of Gnosticism in the figure of God, while
simultaneously giving voice to Gnosticism’s rejection of its subordinate position to
orthodoxy in the figure of the non-ground. This allows us to read Boehme, then, not as a
visionary mystic but as an influential hinge figure whose work is pregnant with an
intellectual ferment, containing within itself a writing that is in conflict with its own
direction, revealing and writing two allegiances: one to the madness of nature and the
other to the reason of God. This writing that is not self-same and constantly represses the
wellspring of its own creative process will erupt in Schelling’s Ages of the World,
breaking open the barriers which protected God from the discordance of his nature in
Boehme, and disclosing the deconstructive potential that had always been inherent within
Gnosticism itself.
When we turn to Schelling’s The Ages of the World, Boehme’s influence on
Schelling becomes much more evident insofar as Schelling begins his narration of the
past by figuring the first nature, like Boehme’s non-ground, as “an unremitting wheel, a
rotatory movement that never comes to a stand-still and in which there is no
differentiation,” wherein “the concept of the beginning, as well as the concept of the end,
again sublimates itself in this circulation” (Schelling Ages 20). The first nature circulates
in this infinite movement during a primordial time before time as we know it, for nature,
Schelling writes, “is an abyss of the past” (Schelling Ages 31). Comprised of three
equipollent figures that each have the right to be for themselves, the first nature remains
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caught in what Schelling calls an unremitting “self-laceration,” because none of these
figures are able to rise above the other “since each also has fully the same claim to be the
being, to be that which has being” (Schelling Ages 11). This equipollence condemns
these figures to suffer their interdependence as a negating, affirming, and unifying
potency within the dialectical movement of the first nature. Boehme’s influence on
Schelling becomes even more obvious, then, through Schelling’s first nature in the way
that he represents it as
[t]he antithesis [that] eternally produces itself, in order always again to be
consumed by the unity . . . [so that] the antithesis is eternally consumed by the
unity in order always to revive itself anew. This is the sanctuary… the hearth of
life that continually incinerates itself and again rejuvenates itself from the ash.
This is the tireless fire through whose quenching, as Heraclitus claimed, the
cosmos was created . . . . This is the object of the ancient Magi teachings and of
that doctrine of fire as a consequence of which the Jewish lawgiver left behind to
his people: “The Lord your God is a devouring fire,” that is, not in God’s inner
and authentic being [Wesen], but certainly in accordance with God’s nature.
(Schelling Ages 20-21)
As the above makes clear, the unremitting wheel of the first nature is described in the
same terms as Boehme’s non-ground, as Schelling thinks it in terms of a “wheel,” “fire,”
“nature,” and especially as a “magic,” a metaphor Boehme repeatedly resorts to in his
writings. Schelling’s writing would therefore seem almost indistinct from Boehme’s, as
he represents the first nature in this way in order to subordinate it to God so that it can act
as the medium by which God can enter into Being. “God,” writes Schelling once again
echoing Boehme, “cannot anywhere in itself be that which has being or becomes (in an
eternal way),” for it “can do so only relationally with respect to an Other” (Schelling
Ages 40). Schelling, therefore, repeats Boehme’s writing of the real as that which must
sacrifice itself in service of the ideal’s demands.
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And yet, Schelling distinguishes himself from Boehme in the way that he writes

the first nature in its original condition, that is, before it enters into relation with God.
Whereas Boehme wrote that nature was creative only after its encounter with the spirit
and was nothing before this relation, Schelling essentializes contradiction into the being
of the first nature in an eternal way, for “[w]ere the first nature in harmony with itself,”
writes Schelling, “it would remain so. It would be constantly One and would never
become Two” (Schelling Ages 12). Since the being of nature is somehow inseparable
from contradiction, God must be that which does not have being but also as what must
have being; God, then, in order to become a God that “acts” (Schelling Ages 26) and yet
remain separate from being, must make nature his “eternal past” so that it “must also be
dealt with as the first and actual precedent of God” (Schelling Ages 39). Nature, then,
takes on an unprethinkable but necessary position that precedes the “actual, living God,”
and consequently interrupts Schelling’s writing of the Triune Godhdead as eternally
consisting of the figures of necessity, freedom, and finally as the unity of both insofar as
it is beyond necessity and freedom as the “eternal freedom, pure conation itself”
(Schelling Ages 27). How is it, then, that Schelling’s writing of the Godhead, another
Boehmian term, must eternally contain the principles of nature and the conscious God
within itself, if nature is the eternal past of God which he must pass through in order to be
fully conscious of himself?
In order for Schelling to resolve this paradox that positions nature’s existence
before God’s, he continues to make use of Boehme’s narrative, which writes the first
nature as a being that wishes to subordinate itself to the authority and eternal freedom of
God, since “in that eternally commencing life [of the first nature] there lies the wish to
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escape from the involuntary movement and from the distress of pining” (Schelling Ages
27). However, Schelling cannot write out the first nature’s surrender to eternal freedom
with the same religious abandon as Boehme. Instead, he writes about “that moment in
which the earthly and the heavenly first divided,” not in terms of a theological or tragic
split, but in terms of a crisis that, in the words of Tilottama Rajan, “may not be resolved
so much as opened up” (Rajan “Abyss” 20). Because, notes Rajan, the highest potency of
the first nature pushes the lowest down in order to enter into relation with the higher
principle of God, we can then read the opening of the crisis as something that is actually
brought on by the way Schelling writes the crisis. Rajan continues,
For in describing the transference of the lower into the higher that constitutes
guidance, he admits to a “potency [and] potentiality” of the lower that has been
“excessively weakened and oppressed by the higher principle.” If the higher is
oppressive, then the higher must itself be part, even a cause, of the crisis. Put
differently, since each principle has an equal right to be that which has being, any
principle that constitutes itself as higher so as to limit what Schelling in 1809 had
called freedom risks being oppressive. But this is, if not to negate, at least to put
any form of guidance under erasure. (Rajan “Abyss” 20)
Indeed, any guidance that Schelling writes into the Ages is unable successfully to direct
its narrative, since the Ages as a project which aimed at encapsulating the three ages of
the world–past, present, and future–was never able to write itself out of the past,
returning “twelve times” (Rajan Abyss 20) to the writing of the first book. So, “[a]s
Schelling is swept back to the beginnings,” to quote David Farrell Krell, “to the distant
elevated past, suffering and fatality become ever more central to his own narrative. It is
as though the way up were the way down,” (Krell Tragic Absolute 130) though the way
down, as we have already seen, means returning to the unprethinkability of the eternally
past, that is, to a beginning that can only be approached from within the order of
madness. The way that Schelling’s repetition of the beginning mirrors the madness of the
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unremitting wheel of the first nature discloses to us that this crisis at the origin had been
inherent yet concealed in Boehme’s mythopoeic narrative all along. Schelling’s
transposition of the Gnostic narrative of God’s self-revelation into a philosophical writing
merely brings to light this crisis insofar as the Ages illustrates that the return to the
beginning of existence reveals an original trauma that cannot be resolved, since it resulted
from the eternal splitting of knowledge from the madness that is its creative centre.
3. 4 Sacrifice, Creation, and the Lacerated Nature
This crisis which, Schelling writes, initiates the split between nature and the
divine thus also opens up a way of reading Schelling alongside Boehme and Bataille,
insofar as we can read nature as a site of creation as well as a site of madness, and
therefore, in the words of Bataille, “no longer as a moment of a homogeneous process–of
a necessary and pitiful process–but as a new laceration within a lacerated nature”
(Bataille “The Pineal Eye” 80). What Boehme and Schelling demonstrate in their writing
of the opposition of nature to the divine is what Bataille will later note about the violence
that is inherent to the dialectical relationship between the real and the ideal. Once the real
enters into relation with the ideal, argues Bataille, it is immediately subordinate to it and
tears, mutilates, and sacrifices itself in order to fulfill the ideal’s commands. Madness,
mutilation, sacrifice, and creation are therefore all intertwined, as the sacrifice or
mutilation of the body assures the survival of the sacrificer and represents a renewal of
the creative act of the real. Madness does not write its own history; if it could, it would
not need the ideal to articulate this self-laceration. This is made clear in how Bataille
demonstrates that madness can only be written through the language of knowledge,
science, or medicine. For his account of madness, as his essay “Sacrificial Mutilation”
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makes clear, comes in the form of a psychological testimony from the clinical journals of
the Annales medico-psychologiques.
On the morning of December 11, he [Gaston F] was walking on the Boulevard de
Ménilmontant, and having arrived at the Père-Lachaise cemetery, he stared at the
sun, and, receiving from its rays the imperative order to tear off his finger,
without hesitation, without feeling any pain, he seized between his teeth his left
index finger, successively broke through the skin, the flexor and extensor tendons,
and the articular ligaments at the level of the phalangeal articulation; using his
right hand, he then twisted the extremity of the dilacerated left index finger,
severing it completely. (Bataille “Sacrificial Mutilation” 61)
The reason for Gaston F.’s mutilation becomes clearer once Batailles relates that he was
inspired by Van Gogh’s own mutilation of his ear, possibly getting the idea to mutilate
himself after having read a biography on Van Gogh. But Gaston F’s act cannot merely be
explained by reading this biography, as Bataille’s reading of this act of auto-mutilation
points toward the significance of the sun for both Van Gogh and Gaston F as the abstract
ideal that commands the madness of self-mutilation. The relation between the sun as the
ideal and the act of self-mutilation as the gory and bestial real is significant, for it was
only after the episode when Van Gogh sent his ear to a girl in a prostitution house in
December 1888, as Bataille aptly points out, that the main theme of Van Gogh’s
paintings became the sun and the sunflower. “This double bond uniting the sun-star,”
writes Bataille, “the sun-flower, and Van Gogh can… be reduced to a normal
psychological theme in which the star is opposed to the withered flower, as are the ideal
term and the real term of the ego” (Bataille “Sacrificial Mutilation” 63). Sacrifice, as
Bataille notes, is always a creative act, insofar as it represents the real’s “desire to
resemble perfectly an ideal term” (Bataille “Sacrificial Mutilation” 66) and is, therefore
not merely an uninterpretable and meaningless act; instead, sacrifice is the act by which
the general economy between the real and the ideal is recommenced, indeed making
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madness that figure, in Schelling’s terms, of “the hearth of the life that continually
incinerates itself and again rejuvenates itself from the ash” (Schelling Ages 20). Without
the real, the ideal will remain unwritten, and, as Derrida notes, “through a single act, [a
decision] links and separates reason and madness . . . as the original act of an order, a fiat,
a decree, and as a schism, a casesura, a separation, a dissection” (Derrida “Cogito” 38).
As we return from Bataille back towards Boehme and Schelling, self-mutilation
must be added to the list of qualities of creation and madness that characterize the writing
of nature. While Boehme writes a hermetical seal around nature and protects spirit from
the pain of existence, Schelling writes a God that “leads human nature down no other
path than that down which God Himself must pass. Participating in everything blind,
dark, and suffering of God’s nature is necessary in order to elevate God to the highest
consciousness” (Schelling Ages 101). To be, for man and God alike, is thus to suffer in
conflict and contradiction. Yet, it is not the external conflict between God and nature that
gives consciousness its character, because, in a proto-typically psychoanalytic turn,
Schelling writes, only nature as “the blind force is capable of inspiration. All conscious
creation presupposes an unconscious creating. Conscious creating is just the unfolding
and setting into opposition of unconscious creating” (Schelling Ages 102). If conscious
creating must have recourse to a constant solicitation of madness as the reserve of
consciousness’s creative acts, Schelling’s writing of madness shows that it has its own
reserve in the form of a base materialism that threatens the economy of exchange
between the ideal and the real. In one of his most metaphorical passages, Schelling writes
of this inborn potential of an ancient discord lying at the bottom of nature:
The ancients did not speak in vain of a divine and holy madness. We even see
nature, in the process of its free unfolding, becoming, in proportion to its
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approach to spirit, ever more, so to speak, frenzied…. Panthers or tigers do not
pull the carriage of Dionysus in vain. For this wild frenzy of inspiration in which
nature found itself when it was in view of the being was celebrated in the nature
worship of prescient ancient peoples by the drunken festivals of Bacchic orgies.
Furthermore, that inner self-laceration of nature, that wheel of initial birth
spinning about itself as if mad, and the terrible forces of the annular drive
operating within this wheel, are depicted in other frightful splendors of the
primeval customs of polytheistic worship by acts of self-flaying rage. One such
act was auto-castration (which was done in order to express either the unbearable
quality of the oppressive force or its cessation as a procreative potency).
(Schelling Ages 102-103)

This passage echoes another passage from Schelling’s Freedom essay, wherein Schelling
compares the loss of balance and control to the generation of things in nature as “a bleak
and wild enthusiasm that breaks out into self-mutilation or, like the priests of the
Phrygian goddess, self-castration which is achieved in philosophy through the
renunciation of reason and science” (Schelling Freedom 26). However, Schelling’s tone
in the Ages changes dramatically from the Freedom essay, as Schelling writes the
relationship between madness, mutilation, and the ceremonies of inspiration as necessary
to the life of the Gods: “panthers or tigers do not pull the carriage of Dionysus in vain.”
Schelling connects the third act, which returns to the Freedom essay’s anxiety over its
inability to control its own narrative, of auto-castration, which can be read in one of two
ways: as a performance expressing the unbearable quality of nature’s “oppression,” or a
cessation of this higher oppression’s procreative potential in favor of a dark, bestial, and
base cessation of procreation. In the restricted economy between the real and the ideal,
the orgiastic festivals carry on as rituals that guarantee the return of the Gods,
characterizing the eternal beginning of this economy as representative of Schelling’s
infinite writing of the creation of nature in the First Outline. On the other hand, autocastration may also bring about the cessation of this eternally recommencing relation of
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the real to the ideal in the removal of nature’s procreative organs. Who is to say, then,
that nature’s madness is held in reserve for the creation of God’s consciousness, if, as
Schelling writes, these festivals may also end with “the carrying about of the
dismembered parts of a lacerated God” (Schelling Ages 103)?
Taken this way, Schelling’s revelation–which remains simultaneously the
revelation that he inherited from Boehme, Christianity, and Gnosticism–brings about its
own metaleptical disfiguration-refiguration of the heretical nature of Gnostic narrative.
Schelling’s disfiguration, in its tone and through the wide-ranging allusions to
philosophy, mysticism, theology, biblical exegesis, and science is perhaps so violent that
the redemptive and loving character ascribed to God becomes forever disfigured by the
base materialism of madness, which could at any moment dissolve the dialectical relation
between the real and the ideal, sending everything back into nothingness. It is in the
subtleties of Schelling’s text and not in any explicit articulation that we are able to see
that Schelling’s text contains within itself the awareness of the absolute contingency of
its existence. Although Boehme and Schelling ask how something can come from
nothing, it cannot avoid the horrifying realization that arises from asking this question
from the progression of its narrative, that is, the realization that there is always the
possibility that there could have been nothing.
Boehme never seems to realize that existence is not guaranteed, whereas
Schelling in some passages seems to insist that the other possibility would be in fact
psychologically indigestible, declaring “uncontainment is everywhere also imperfection”
and only “[c]ontainment is the real consummation of every work” (Schelling Ages 93).
Schelling’s Ages, though, is uncontainable as it suffers from its auto-immunity, for every
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form of guidance that he constructs to try to contain the impossible excessiveness of this
narrative of God’s self-revelation is merely a barrier to conceal the fear and dread that is
inherent to the abyssal nature of Schelling’s writing. As madness is at once the hearth of
life and the unremitting wheel that miserably rotates and produces itself, it does so not
merely because it is subordinate to the life of the ideal; in the way that Schelling writes
this “life of loathing and anxiety” (Schelling Ages 46), we see that its anxiety comes not
only from above, but also from below, from the abyss that threatens to engulf the first
nature’s activity at any second. The madness of the incessant movement of the first
nature shows an awareness of the absolute contingency of its existence; because it is
terrified of being thrown back at any moment into non-existence, it eternally sacrifices
itself, pulling the carriage of God towards a point that is infinitely and eternally out of
reach. In this sense, if Schelling inherits a writing that is influenced by or comes from
Boehme’s Gnosticism, it also shows that Schelling’s Gnosticism is truly the heretical
other of orthodox Christianity, since its writing eternally narrates the history of its
knowledge as well as the history of its madness.
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Writing, Repression, and the Impossibility of Forgetting
4. 1 Introduction
	
  
Up until now, this thesis has read Schelling’s texts ‘otherwise,’ in the words of
Nancy, by finding points in the First Outline, the Freedom essay, and The Ages of the
World that open up these texts to their own deconstruction. Each text we have read is
never complete, and, as such, none of them amount to a dead thing, but rather are
somewhere in between fixed and evolving. Each text legitimates itself in the process of
its own work, in the sense that each is in the process of writing its own mythology, as
“[m]ythology,” as Nancy quotes Schelling’s later Philosophy of Revelation, “is therefore
figuration proper” (Nancy The Inoperative Community 54). The writing of Schelling’s
texts has revealed to us that each text has failed to conceive of one systematic philosophy,
not because of an inadequacy on the part of Schelling, but precisely because the essence
of writing itself is doomed to fail the demands of idealism. Schelling’s failure is not truly
a failure nor is it truly a success; “failure does not put an end to writing” (Blanchot “From
Dread”14). Schelling’s writing is above all an honest writing in the sense developed by
Blanchot, for he has not imposed upon it a law that it should follow and has always
allowed his writing to be when he could very well have stopped writing and therefore
ceased to be a writer.
But in the context of the works that we have read, The Ages of The World makes
available to us as readers a writing that is unlike the other works we have seen. While its
system is similar to the one Schelling writes in the Freedom essay, insofar as it shares
much of the same terminology, and focuses on the writing of the self-revelation of God,
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the narrative structure that allows the Freedom essay to be read in a linear and
straightforward manner has been disfigured and unravelled in the Ages. The project of
The Ages of the World is also different because it went unpublished during Schelling’s
lifetime. It remained hidden from the public; it was a draft in the truest sense of the word
as that which was never meant for the public eye. Schelling, whose writing had always
been so daring and speculative, and who was criticized by Hegel precisely for “work[ing]
out his philosophy in view of the public” (Hegel 513), had suddenly become incapable of
presenting any of the extant versions he had written. While the third chapter showed one
way of reading the Ages otherwise by reading it as Schelling’s writing of heresy rather
than his quiet abandonment to theology, this final chapter seeks to show the Ages as a
text that most properly gives itself over to the cruelty of a reading that reveals the
nothingness behind writing, the dread of the writer, and the abyss of language. Focusing
once again on the 1815 version of The Ages of the World, I argue that the Ages can be
read as a reflection on writing itself as it puts into question the very act of writing, insofar
as the Ages asks what makes writing possible in the first place. The figure of the Godhead
reflects the nothingness of the writer and shows a radical questioning of the idea of
writing, since the Godhead, the writer, and writing as arche-writing, it will be argued, can
be read as the transcendental signifiers of the text. In this sense, Schelling’s figure of the
Godhead, like Derrida’s conception of différance, opens up a deconstructive reading of
the text. Rather than grounding the text, the Godhead exposes the text to the crisis of its
writing that results from the radical contingency of its abyssal origin.
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4. 2 From Philosophy to Literature
	
  
The Ages, in this sense, becomes no longer merely a philosophical work, for it has
discovered the very essence of its being literature! It is literature in the deconstructive
sense, as expressed by Blanchot in “Literature And the Right to Death:” “literature begins
at the moment when literature becomes a question” (Blanchot “Literature” 21). Further,
the Ages can be read as literature, to quote from Michel Foucault, since
there is nothing for it do but to curve back in a perpetual return upon itself, as if
its discourse could have no other content than the expression of its own form; it
addresses itself to itself as a writing subjectivity, or seeks to re-apprehend the
essence of all literature in the movement that brought it into being; and thus all its
threads converge upon the finest of points – singular, instantaneous, and yet
absolutely universal – upon the simple act of writing. (Foucault 300)
However, this discovery, I will argue, also necessitated of Schelling the act of a
repression in his subsequent work. The Ages did not merely represent the failure to write
the manifestation of God, for, within the context of Schelling’s body of work, it also
represented the abyssal element of nothingness that traumatizes the act of writing itself,
representing the necessity that makes writing possible and the necessity of the
impossiblity of writing.
Because writing, here, is in a sense always a writing about itself in a perpetual
return upon itself, we can read Schelling’s Godhead as the figure, to quote Jacques
Derrida, of “arche-writing” insofar as arche-writing opens up the possibility for the
activity of writing. In the same way that the Godhead brings about the conscious God and
the first nature in an unprethinkable and impossible decision, so too does it function as
arche-writing functions, as the idea that allows for a writing of difference to be. Archewriting, according to Derrida, is that which eludes the “vulgar concept of writing”; it is a
“movement of difference, irreducible arche-synthesis, opening in one and the same
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possibility, temporalization as well as relationship with the other and language” that is at
once “the condition of all linguistic systems,” and yet it cannot “form a part of the
linguistic system itself and be situated as an object in its field” (Derrida Of
Grammatology 60). Whereas many readings of the Ages point to the ungrounding and
deconstructive quality of the first nature, the first nature is, in a sense, the Ungrund of the
text insofar as it functions as an ungrounding principle within the economy of the text.
Despite the first nature being the site of creation, it thus requires the Godhead as the
original beginning that cannot be economized, as something beyond and above it, as what
is absolute and pre-figures both the first nature and the actual God. Consequently, the
first nature, though it ungrounds itself as it ungrounds God’s authority over it, remains
mutually dependent on the figure of God and “is [therefore] more written than said, it is
economized” (Derrida “Cogito” 62).
In contrast to the unconditioned Nature Schelling writes of in the First Outline as
Being itself, the Godhead is constructed as the synthetic point that precedes and “is
exclusively above all Being” (Schelling Ages 23), since “it cannot be that which has
being [seyend seyn] with regard to itself” (Schelling Ages 6). The Godhead, a term
borrowed once again from Jacob Boehme, is a nothingness, what Derrida calls the
originary trace that is dislocated from “the appearance and functioning of [the]
difference” that actually arises in the opposition of God with nature, and therefore is “an
originary synthesis not preceded by any absolute simplicity” (Derrida Of Grammatology
62). The Godhead, the first nature, and God as figures of the eternal “past beginning in
dark night” (Schelling Ages 3), allow Schelling to write speculatively of these not as they
actually appear in time, but as they relate to each other in an eternal way abstracted from
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historical time in the book of the eternal past. While they remain suspended in the
eternity that precedes time, Schelling discursively conflates the Godhead with the duality
that will arise after the crisis that brings about existence, so that God is at once the
Godhead, the Godhead is at once God, and what “is necessary in God [is called] the
nature of God” (Schelling Ages 5). He does this using a logical explanation, positing
[o]nly an identity of the being, of the link (of the copula). The true meaning of
every judgment, for instance, A is B, can only be this: that which is A is that
which is B, or that which is A and that which is B are one and the same. . . . the “x
that is A” and “the x that is B” is one and the same, that is the, the same x. There
are actually three propositions contained in the above cited proposition. The first,
“A=x,” the second, “B=x,” and, following from this, the third, “A and B are one
and the same,” that is, “both are x.” (Schelling Ages 8)
And yet, during this primordial time, the Triune Godhead is more precisely
nothing since it has not distinguished anything in itself. In the same way Blanchot says
that “before his work exists,” the writer “not only does . . . not know who he is, but he is
nothing. He only exists as a function of the work . . . . it has value, truth and reality only
through the words which unfold it in time and inscribe it in space” (Blanchot “Literature”
24). The Godhead, as the original beginning (Urgrund) of the Ages, is therefore never
fully something that exists, but can only be articulated in between the two figures of God
and the first nature, as an abyss that gives birth, that acts, envelopes, and imperceptibly
embodies and yet withdraws from difference. The only apparent distinction that can be
said of the Godhead in this primordial time is that it is “the Supreme Being” which “for
itself is groundless and borne by nothing,” and is furthermore “in itself the antithesis of
personality” (Schelling Ages 6). Schelling does not define what the Godhead’s place or
movement within the text is, because the Godhead functions as a juncture of strategic
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ambiguity that opens up the articulation or the construction of the Triune nature of
necessity, freedom, and the unity contained within the Godhead’s eternal freedom.
If, as Schelling writes, “[everyone] agrees that the Godhead is the Supreme
Being, the purest Love, infinite communicativity and emanation” (Schelling Ages 5), yet
if it is also at the same time an indifference, or the unconditioned, a problem arises in
attributing to the Godhead these seemingly contradictory affects. In truth, from where
does this concept of Godhead as pure love, communicativity and emanation originate?
Interestingly, there is evidence to support that Schelling may have in fact stumbled upon
the concept of the Godhead at the end of the Freedom essay, and it is there that we see
the beginning of this problem of attributing conditions to the unconditioned. Having
reached the end of the investigation in the Freedom essay, Schelling writes of a “being
before all ground and before all that exists, thus generally before any duality,” what he
calls “the original ground or the non-ground [Ungrund]” (Schelling Freedom 68). This
original ground–or non-ground, maintaining the concept’s essential ambiguity even in the
Freedom essay–is described as “the absolute indifference [Indifferenz]” of duality, and is
described not in terms of being a product of opposites but rather “is its own being
separate from all opposition, a being against which all opposites ruin themselves, that is
nothing else than their very not-Being [Nichtsein]” (Schelling Freedom 68-69). The
origin of the original ground remains mysterious to readers, since its description comes
rather late in the exposition of the Freedom essay’s argument; however, what becomes
evident to readers of the 1815 version of the Ages is the similarity between the nonground and the Godhead as the unity as well as the figure which “instead of abolishing
the distinction [of duality] . . . rather posits and confirms it” (Schelling Freedom 69).
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And yet Schelling in the Ages makes the Godhead the origin as well as the

highest figure of God’s self-revelation, whereas the non-ground’s appearance in the
Freedom essay is motivated more by Schelling’s desire to close off the narrative than
anything else. Turning to it only at the end of the text as a rhetorical coup de grâce that
eliminates the anarchy of the eternal ground (Schelling Freedom 70), Schelling
transforms the non-ground from its original articulation into the highest expression of
love in order to discursively legitimate the text’s theodicean rhetoric. Schelling writes,
this is the secret of love, that it links such things of which each could exist for
itself, yet does not and cannot exist without the other. For this reason as duality
comes to be in the non-ground, love comes to be as well, linking that which exists
(that which is ideal) with the ground for existence. . . . Then everything is
subordinate to spirit. . . . [But above] spirit, however, is the initial non-ground that
is no longer indifference (neutrality) and yet not the identity of both principles,
but rather a general unity that is the same for all and yet gripped by nothing that is
free from all and yet a beneficence acting in all, in a word, love, which is all in all.
(Schelling Freedom 70)
In this sense, the non-ground prefigures the Godhead and takes on the function of
Derrida’s pure trace, since “[i]t is not the question of a constituted difference . . . but
rather, [is] before all determination of the content, of the pure movement which produces
difference. The (pure) trace is différance” (Derrida Of Grammatology 62). However, in
the Freedom essay, Schelling instrumentalizes the non-ground by turning it into the
culminating point of history; to quote from Blanchot, it therefore “freezes in the form of
an artifice whose exterior complexity is constantly being reduced by the intention that has
brought it into being” (Blanchot “From Dread” 12). This false unity is therefore a
repression of its antithesis in bad faith, since the non-ground, as a being that is above God
and eternally prior to it, is meant to ground the personality of God and bring about the
duality of his existence. The artificiality of its expression becomes more evident, since it
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comes at the end of the text rather than at the beginning, insofar as the introduction of the
non-ground in fact disfigures the narrative of freedom and personality that came before it,
and therefore negates what it was meant to organize. As Schelling states,
the whole is distorted, and it also follows then that this system abolishes the
personality of the highest being. We have been hitherto silent about this
frequently heard accusation as about many others, but believe that we have
established the first clear concept of personality in this treatise. In the non-ground
or indifference there is admittedly no personality. But is the beginning point really
the whole? (Schelling Freedom 73)
Schelling’s question to the reader as to whether the beginning is really commensurate
with the whole is a question which he cannot answer himself. If the non-ground disrupts
the end by opening up new problems for Schelling while it tries to close off others, it is
for this reason that Schelling transposes the non-ground into the figure of the Godhead at
the beginning of the Ages in order to ensure that the beginning point really does amount
to the whole which it produces.
In between the writing of the Freedom essay and the 1815 version of the Ages,
Schelling loses faith in the redemptive potential of the non-ground. Instead, he effects a
necessary “distancing” or repression of the beginning, excluding this beginning from the
one in which God is eternally caught. This exclusion prefigures the articulation of
primary repression in psychoanalysis, not in the sense developed by Freud, but more
appropriately that developed by Lacan. For Lacan, primary repression is not a psychical
act, but “a structural feature of language itself – namely, its necessary incompleteness, the
impossibility of ever saying ‘the truth about the truth’ (Ec, 868)” (Evans 165). For
“God,” writes Schelling, “has no beginning insofar as it has no beginning of its
beginning. The beginning in it is an eternal beginning, that is, a beginning that was, as
such, from all eternity and still always is one that never ceases to be a beginning”
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(Schelling Ages 17). Consequently, if God’s beginning is always alienated from its
beginning, actual beginning, the inscription of God as the pronouncement of the word, is
merely one that is in media res, it is “[t]he beginning that a being has outside of itself,”
writes Schelling, that is opposed to “the beginning that a being has within itself. . . . A
beginning from which it can be alienated and from which it can distance itself is different
than a beginning in which it eternally remains” (Schelling Ages 17). It is here that we
begin to see a difference between the Godhead and the difference which precipitates from
the emergence of the actual God and the first nature. God is eternally beginning, which
echoes the Freedom essay’s formulation of the non-ground’s division “into two equally
eternal beginnings” (Schelling Freedom 70); but in 1815 Schelling articulates two
beginnings, one that is appropriate to God, and one that a being has outside of itself and
which it must exclude from itself in order to be. If we were to conceive this alienated
beginning to be the beginning of the Godhead, how is it that we would be able to
represent this transcendental origin of the actual God as a beginning that is itself, as
God’s eternal freedom, the condition for eternity and yet outside of eternity? If the
beginning in which God finds himself necessitates a primary repression which excludes
the alienated beginning, has God found himself in a space of representation out of which
he can never escape and to which he is irrevocably exposed, or, quoting Blanchot, has the
Godhead entered “into the workings of a vital contingency which he cannot control or
even observe” (Blanchot “Literature” 28)? God is thus exposed to the radical contingency
of his own revelation, since he is excluded from his writing of history in the same way as
“the origin,” as Jason Wirth puts it, or “the author of philosophy cannot become an object
of philosophy” (Wirth Ages xv). The decision for God had always already been, since the
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moment God exists is the decision for existence, the decision of eternal freedom and of
the Godhead; but since the decision does not know itself as a decision, it is not necessary
but is radically free in its originary implausibility. Because the Godhead does not decide
anything for itself, it is rather an unprethinkable and impossible decision for God as it is
for writing, because it is, to quote from Nancy, “the decision for philosophy, the decision
that delivers and will deliver philosophy to its destiny” (Nancy The Experience of
Freedom 7).
While Schelling may write “that unity in duality and duality in unity . . . is what
is essential in divine individuality” (Schelling Ages 51), this ambiguity is Schelling’s
attempt at merging the emergence of God with the figure of the Godhead, writing two
names for God in order to write over the abyss that separates the alienated beginning of
the Godhead with God’s eternally beginning life. As the Godhead is the antithesis of
personality, personality, writes Schelling, “is the principle by dint of which God is He
Himself as He Himself” and is the “ultimate act or the ultimate potency by which an
intelligent being exists in an incommunicable fashion” (Schelling Ages 107). God is
destined to be as the higher that draws out the lower, but in order to be that personality
that writes itself into nature, God must in a certain sense be outside of itself, and is thus
never connected to the force, the proper name, the transcendental signifier that is
simultaneously the condition of its existence as what puts its indelible personality at risk
of erasure. Elohim, writes Schelling, is the name “whose true pronunciation is unknown,”
and is the expression of the Godhead as “pure breath, pure spirit” (Schelling Ages 52).
Elohim “occupies,” in the words of Nancy, “with the text, the very place of a name that
flees and yet returns, finding itself alternately . . . firmly distanced, then evoked in its
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very distance as the site or as the index of a form of intrigue of the absenting of sense”
(Nancy Dis-Enclosure 86).
Jehovah, on the other hand, is God’s other name as that which is expressed, the
aspect of God that acts and communicates and answers the world when the world asks
what is God, as Schelling illustrates in Moses’s conversation with God, for “Jehovah
answered, “hence, you should say, ‘Jehovah, the Elohim of your fathers, sends me to you.
That is my name for eternity’” (Schelling Ages 52). Schelling’s meditation on the Old
Testament’s names for God shows that indeed there is the God of personality but also the
plurality of names of the “tetragrammaton,” Elohim, the true God, which inscribes a
nominalization of ambiguity in the connection between Godhead and the God of duality,
inscribing an absence in the actuality of God that is somehow above and beyond the God
that is expressed in the world. The question of God’s self-revelation, therefore, must
always return to this question of the plural Elohim which acts in a “verb in the singular,
where the meaning, for example, of bara Elohim is, “the one who created is Elohim,”
(Schelling Ages 52) functioning like Derrida’s pure trace as that which is written as the
absence of life, not as writing’s solution, and as the origin that cannot explain why
anything is written. For the Godhead remains above being as an absence, fleeing from the
order of the world which it creates as the alienated condition that inscribes God into
existence. In this sense, as Schelling writes in the Philosophical Letters we “cannot get
rid of the idea of God” (Schelling Letters 158), because God is forever caught in the
same movement as we are, he is forever an idea as he is forever the word, Jehovah, that
arises from the transcendental signified of the Godhead that initiates and yet is outside the
order of language. God is therefore not “in question,” to quote from Nancy, for the “name
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God must, then, represent something other than a concept here, more precisely, it must
bear and bring to a head a trait common to names as such: to be at the extremity and the
extenuation of sense” (Nancy Dis-Enclosure 87).
4. 3 Philosophy as Auto-Deconstruction or Auto-Biography?
	
  
In this sense, the Ages is a mise en abyme of the writer’s relationship to his or
her work, and more importantly represents Schelling’s relationship to the Ages itself, for
once writing begins the writer is forever cut off from the work in the same way as
Schelling writes that “the Godhead sits enthroned over a world of terrors” (Schelling
Ages 49). While one could take God to be the subject of its own history in the way
Schelling writes that one “who could write completely the history of their own life would
also have, in a small epitome, concurrently grasped the history of the cosmos” (Schelling
Ages 3), we can read the Ages itself as undertaking this tragic and impossible destiny to
attempt to achieve self-sameness across the irreducible necessity of its doubling. Taking
Schelling’s Introduction to the Ages as a serious statement on the narrative quality of
philosophy, the book of the Past represents a self-reflexive position on the writing of the
project of the Ages. The eternally ancient knowledge discussed in the introduction
anticipates the unfolding of this non-coexistent knowledge in the writing of the Ages, not
as something that can be pointed to in one concept or be contained within a moment, but
rather as an auto-generative process, a narrative, or a fiction that takes on meaning only
within the mythology, philosophy’s autopoeisis, which philosophy always finds itself in
the process of figuring. Schelling already understood that writing is itself subject to this
same freedom, by the fact that what is known is always “narrated” and that “that
knowledge [that is narrated] is the simple consequence and development of its own
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concepts. . . . Its true representation is that it is the development of a living, actual being
[Wesen] which presents itself in it” (Schelling Ages xxxv). But the living, actual “being,”
that Schelling writes can be more appropriately translated as “essence,” as even Jason
Wirth notes. “Das Wesen,” Wirth writes, “presents one of the most difficult translation
challenges in most any work by Schelling,” for, “Das Wesen is not a present essence, a
being present in its integrity” (Wirth 136). Instead, essence is that something which
escapes and makes its presence known through its absence from the process of
knowledge, of being, of writing, etc. The Ages distinguishes itself from Schelling’s other
texts since it finally writes of that present/absent essence in its articulation of the
Godhead, as the God which created the world, but always remains beyond or above it as
eternal freedom. The Godhead’s eternal freedom is that freedom, in the sense developed
by Nancy and Bataille, that
prevents itself from being founded. The existence of God was to be free in the
sense that the freedom that sustained his existence could not become one of its
predicates or properties. Theology and philosophy had certainly recognized this
limit, or this dilemma. Conceived of as freedom’s necessary being, God risked (if
one did not elaborate subtle ad hoc arguments) ruining both himself and freedom.
(“Is not freedom the power God lacks, or which he only has verbally, since he
cannot disobey the command that he is, the command of which he is the
guarantor?” Georges Bataille, Literature and Evil). The freedom of the gods (if
one must speak of gods…), like every freedom, makes them susceptible to
existence or nonexistence (they can die): it is not their attribute, but their destiny.
(Nancy The Experience of Freedom 12)
The figure of the Godhead may allow Schelling to begin writing, but it is also what
eludes the bounds and limits of representation as it is itself that boundless freedom that
submits God–and furthermore the text–to the realization of the absolute horror of its
contradictory and contingent existence.
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In this sense, the tone Schelling adopts to describe the contradiction between

the negative and affirmative principle in the Ages becomes representative of the trauma
his own writing undergoes in writing the process of contradiction. Therefore,
contradiction for Schelling is no longer something merely vital but is tragically absurd,
cruel, and ultimately “is insufferable to everything and everything that finds itself in it”
(Schelling Ages 12). This is especially true in Schelling’s expression of the systole and
diastole that expands and contracts, first as the system’s “living concept,” “the wheel of
birth,” as its “universal ebb and flow” (Schelling Ages 20-21). In the process of this
alternatingly expanding and contracting movement that “seeks rest, but does not find it,”
a nagging anxiety overtakes the contradiction’s “[ever]commencing inefficacy”; although
the wheel turns, it does not do so because of its own self-confidence, but is “scared and
fears that it would lose existence and hence, contracts anew” (Schelling Ages 90). The
ground of all creation, the “beating heart of the Godhead,” the “fountain of eternal life,”
the first nature which had initially been that boundless and powerful figure of Nature in
the First Outline, in 1815 comes to express its horror and abjection over the abyss of its
freedom. Therefore, if the project of The Ages of the World in its first two versions could
still be rightfully labeled a pursuit of absolute knowledge, as were the projects the System
of Transcendental Idealism and the Freedom essay, the third version reveals this pursuit
not only to be interminable and unachievable but a doomed pursuit that is absolutely
horrifying to the philosopher.
As a result of Schelling’s insistence on the potency of contradiction as the
vitality of philosophy, contradiction arises as the only way of writing, not only
dialectically, but also narratively. But this process in the Ages from 1815 provides a
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different sense regarding contradiction from the way contradiction functions in the first
two versions of the Ages, characterizing it in terms of a dreaded resignation to the horror
and madness that cannot be redeemed by God, knowledge, or love. Instead, contradiction
is what dooms the philosopher and the poet to eternally retell the tragedy of the Ages, for,
in the words of Schelling,
The contradiction that we have here conceived is the fountain of eternal life. The
construction of this contradiction is the highest task of science. Hence, the
objection of the philosopher would start science with a contradiction means just as
much to the philosopher as it would to remind the tragic poet, after hearing the
introduction of the work, that, after such a beginning, the work could only come
to a horrible ending, and to cruel deeds and bloody events. This was precisely the
poet’s intent when they set out. (Schelling Ages 90)
And it is because there was never a decision to set out otherwise. If every beginning only
ends in tragedy, if the path that is set before the writer again and again by the eternal
beginning must be covered in its own blood, only to be again bloodied in yet another illfated attempt, the only question left for us to ask Schelling is, “why?” The right answer
would appear to be simply, “why not”; however, this answer is too simple, and merely reinserts itself into the “cision,” “the doubling of ourselves . . . in which there are two
beings, a questioning being and an answering being” (Schelling Ages xxxvi). While the
introduction figures this doubling of the self as a positive dialectical method towards the
achievement of knowledge, through the writing of the Ages, dialectics becomes
disfigured, and Schelling ultimately loses faith in dialectics as a viable process that would
lead to a synthetic end. Rather, every point in the dialectic becomes yet another instance
of the “unremitting wheel” upon which all answers and questions ruin themselves.
Rather, insofar as there should be unity, there should also be antithesis. Or unity
and antithesis should themselves again be in antithesis. But the antithesis is in and
for itself no contradiction. It could be no more contradictory that there could be A
as well as B, than that just as there is unity, there is antithesis. Again, these are,
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between themselves, equivalent. The antithesis can as little surrender to unity as
unity can surrender to the antithesis. (Schelling Ages 10)

Whereas dialectics, for Schelling, had been a method of working through the idea of
progress by means of the dynamism he attributed to nature in the First Outline and the
Freedom essay, and also as a means to posit a final synthesis somewhere in the future, in
the Ages, there is no possibility of escaping the past except through something
unprethinkable and unrepresentable. Therefore, dialectics cannot provide the explanation
for the emergence of the Godhead into existence as God and the first nature, neither can it
posit a final unity, for the positing of unity in the Ages is thus nothing else but a
repression of unity’s antithesis.
And if dialectics have failed, the Ages also signals the failure of the
imagination. For the eternal past is itself something that must be imagined in order for
Schelling to conceive of the idea of an eternal present, as he writes, “if one cannot
imagine a present that is not founded on a past, then there can be no eternal present that is
not based on an eternal past” (Schelling Ages 43). As has been shown above, the eternal
past was imagined in order to posit a time when the Godhead, as “the purest knowledge”
that does not yet know itself as such, must posit something as opposed to and outside of
itself to exit this realm of the eternally past: “Only in relation to something else that is
Being to it can the highest Being comport itself as what has being and can pure
knowledge comport itself as what knows and hence, be raised to actus” (Schelling Ages
44). And yet, the Ages is never able to write itself out of the past, except without the use
of what Schelling calls “a universal magic” (Schelling Ages 66). Therefore, the
imagination too must resort to deception and illusions as the means to overcome the
representation of the eternally past and posit the possibility of entering into the mythical
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age of the eternally present. As the imagination cannot be the solution to the cruel
ambiguity of existence, the imagination instead shows itself to be the sleep of reason that
produces monsters.
By the end of the 1815 version of the Ages, Schelling assumes the identity of
Maurice Blanchot’s writer, who “is called upon by his dread to perform a genuine
sacrifice of himself . . . . [for he] must be destroyed, in an act that really puts him at
stake” (Blanchot “From Dread to Language” 7-8). Schelling was in a sense destroyed by
this text, which is to say that Schelling’s repeated attempts at the text, since each extant
version is representative of this repeated attempt at beginning, are thus expressions of the
trauma of Schelling’s writing; it is this traumatic writing that at last takes hold of
Schelling in the writing of the 1815 version of the text. In a sense, the Ages is
representative of this repeated trauma as it could be read not only as Schelling’s attempt
at a magnum opus but also as what put an end to Schelling’s radically speculative style of
writing that was present in the Ages as well as the Freedom essay. Since the Freedom
essay was one of Schelling’s last published works that theorizes the narrative of God’s
self-revelation in this radical re-figuration, the Ages, as the unpublished and unfulfilled
follow-up to the Freedom essay, puts an end to thinking by means of this genre of the
writing of an absolute and living pantheism. The Ages discloses, therefore, that its
writing, Schelling’s writing, is itself traumatized in the same way that the first nature is
traumatized by the process of its creation in the “violent revulsion” (Schelling Ages 91)
of its miserable existence. Since, “as an old book says, all deeds under the sun are full of
trouble and everything languishes in toil” (Schelling Ages 90), the dread of writing may
also be hidden away, concealed out of the fear and anxiety it had caused the writer. The
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dread of writing, in the sense developed by Blanchot, does not negate writing just as the
Godhead does not negate God or the first nature; it is the feeling that gives itself over to
the unbearable quality of writing, as the Ages clearly indicates. It must be asked, then,
was this trauma of writing that emerged from the nothingness of writing not in fact the
reason for the unpublished nature of Schelling’s The Ages of the World? If it was, perhaps
this was because Schelling had taken the project of the Freedom essay, that project of
developing a real and living pantheism as opposed to Spinoza’s mechanistic pantheism,
and theorized it to its absolute limits in the Ages; in the process the God of pantheism was
not only exposed to the horrors of the world but also to the arbitrariness and absurdity of
its own existence. Was it that Schelling, then, realized that this real pantheism, which he
writes through the Godhead’s unprethinkable decision for existence, could never end “in
the harmony and wonderfully blessed unity of the cosmos” as he might have believed in
1809, but that he found “real pantheism to be horrifying” (Schelling Ages 104)? Or is it
because Schelling does “away with these limits,” that he makes the Godhead into an
“object . . . no longer representable,” so that, “he himself [has] strayed beyond the limits
of representation, . . . [and found] himself lost” (Schelling PL 193)?
All of these questions can only guess at Schelling’s feelings towards the writing
of The Ages of the World, but they are, in a certain way, legitimated because Schelling
never brought the text to publication. And since the text ends by demanding its own
repression, the writing clamors for its own forgetting and for a negation of its trauma. As
Schelling writes, “this pantheistic system of primeval times, this primordial state of
universal unity and universal closure, is precisely what is ever more to be repressed and
posited as past by the following time” (Schelling Ages 108). And yet, as we know, the
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writer no longer has control over the text once it has been written, and is forever, like the
Godhead, cut off from its creation; its only position is to stand witness over the world of
terrors for which it was the condition. While this reading has indeed been cruel in
disclosing the repression covering over the Ages, we must do Schelling a final kindness,
by giving him the last word, giving him a chance to explain why he never published the
Ages. Although “[h]e can no longer give distinct form to the boundless object[,] [i]t is
indistinctly present to his mind. Where shall he bind it, where seize it, where [or how
could he have] put limits to its excessive power” (Schelling PL 193)?
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